AH1: CEO duality leads to lower returns to shareholders.
AH2: Any observed positive effects of CEO duality are caused by long-term compensation and are spurious.
By contrast, stewardship theory yields two opposite hypotheses regarding CEO governance:
SH1: CEO duality leads to higher return to shareholders.
SH2: The positive effects of CEO duality are not due to the spurious effects of long-term compensation.
The present study will test these four hypotheses to provide an examination of the empirical validity of these two competing theories regarding the roˆle and rewards of the CEO. It should be noted that the primary focus of the present study is on the roˆle structure issue of CEO duality, rather than on the study of rewards. Accordingly, the long-term compensation variable and hypotheses are introduced in the nature of a control in order to deal with the issue of alternative agency theory explanations of any positive findings about CEO duality.