or so have contributed to increasing the cultural divide between Buddhist Thais and Muslim Malays
and between the Malays and the Thai state. Secondly, these developments have resulted in a
chance structure which favors the mobilization of support by local agitators and the justification of
their violence. Three developments are particularly noteworthy: firstly, the increasing importance of
Islamism in the region; secondly a change of policy by the Thaksin government when it came into
power in February 2001; thirdly, unsuccessful conflict management by this and following governments.
Since the turn of the millennium, Pattani has (once again) been the scene of a highly conflictridden
situation. Cultural factors are responsible for this in no small measure. And although it is
true that socio-economic exclusion, cultural marginalization and the resulting conflict potential can
be traced back to the beginnings of Siamese/Thai rule in the early 20th century, it is only the specific
mixture of factors in evidence since the start of this decade that has pushed the existing
conflict potential into a new escalation phase.
Admittedly, the struggle of separatist groups against the Thai government is superficially concerned
with the conflict-laden subject of "secession" – or more exactly, with the question of
legitimate political control over the area formerly known as the Sultanate of Pattani. However, on
the Malay side both the religious focus and the linguistic aspect serve to generate identity and are
subject matter within the conflict. This is also true, albeit a to a lesser extent, on the "Thai" side.
Quite obviously a large number of the rebels' attacks are targeted at establishments and groups of
people that symbolically represent the Buddhist/Thai-speaking majority of society. But on the Thai
side, too, signs of a "cultural" interpretation of the conflict are to be found.
Of the three symbolic cultural dimensions isolated as relevant in the concept of this cultural conflict–
language, religion, historicity – all three play a role as subjects of conflict. The first two
mentioned in particular, form the core of the Muslim Malay population in the conflict region's cultural
identity. However, the historical story of their origins and their experiences of the Thai state's
national educational policies with their both marginalizing and discriminatory effects until well into
the second half of the 20th century were decisive. (Yusuf, 2006).
At the same time, the cultural identity (kwam pen thai) and the political self-image of the Thai majority
of the population is determined by the three intermeshing elements language (Thai),
Theravada Buddhism and the monarchy (Thanet, 2006). As culturally different khaeck – even today,
the current term for the Muslim Malays in the south – Pattani's Muslims are not included in
Thai culture or its political community. Even today, they are largely considered "foreigners" or "outsiders"
(which approximates to the literal translation of khaeck) by the majority of the population.
Both from a historical perspective and currently, the articulation of this independent identity and the
political justification of the violent struggle by the various rebel movements has recourse to linguistic,
religious and historical terms and symbols as is demonstrated by the way the groups refer to
themselves, their mobilization rhetoric, the targets of their attacks and the avowed objectives of
their struggle, although the latter could be described as somewhat diffuse. In this respect, the close
interaction of the different cultural components makes it difficult to choose one of them as decisive.
However, the best definition of the Pattani conflict would be to characterize it as a religious/
linguistic conflict type.