repression of any potentially sublime issues of naming the filed, issues that might make impossible the point of the exercise, find meaning or meanings in reality. To see the Holocaust, for example, as an event with meanings that go beyond nation, groups, polities, ideas, technologies, or other forms of proper historical study, might be deemed religious or mystical if it aimed at the highest forms of reflection on meaning; it might deemed merely physical if its focus was upon lower matters, such as environmental impact or the poisonous effects of chemicals. The former case is the semantic search for a final meaning; the latter is a choice of elements for the historical lexicon that are not traditionally historical. On the other hand, the discourse of meaning, the highest, semantic, level where the multivarious forms of events take on a clear and inevitable shape, posed an equal threat to the possibility of a plausible discipline. For in the explicit expression of a governing system capable of producing a clear shape for the social past and a clear path for the social future lay an ideological force that could be accepted only at the cost of disciplinary credibility. Thus, Christian providentialism, Comtean positivism, Hegelian dialectic, and Marxian materialism all fall away from a disciplined social science. An explicit look at the lexical level made meaning impossible; equally unacceptable was a sematic clarity that provides too much meaning. Disciplinarily, then will be confined to the two middle levels of representation, the grammatical and the syntactical. It is there that rules and usage are enshrined and explicated, and this was the task that disciplines of counting, arranging, and resorting predesignated items. The meaning of these operations would, ideally, spring from the process itself, without an application of some external interpretive system whose intrusion would be reductive. The Science Effect and the Modern Fact.
The unquestioned lexical item of most social scientific work is the fact, the thing that is certain, demonstrated, and known. Yet factuality has a history, and as Mary Poovey has suggested, the modern fact (as opposed, say, to the ancient fact, or the postmodern fact) is to be distinguished from an earlier sort which was a reflection of metaphysical essences. Modern facts are empirical and recorded in the “transparent” language of numbers, although the telling of the relationship of fact and number is involved and equivocal. Double entry bookkeeping, itself related to sixteenth-century rhetorical, created a numbering of things that would change both politics and knowledge. Numerical expertise per se replaced that mercantile concreteness of the accountants; as this happened, the particulars of the accounting books came to be seen as “natural matter of fact” (Poovey 1998:29-91). By the 1830s the debate over numbering, or rather over induction from numbered things, saw a successful appeal to statistics, “a dull, dry parade of stupid figures,” against the “pathetic tales” of a literary sort; the value of the figures was precisely in their dullness, “a guarantee against the undue embellishment associated with fiction, hyperbole, and rhetoric” (Poovey 1998:313). The insoluble methodological problems of induction – how to move from number facts to general principles – were obscured by this triumph over fiction and rhetoric. At the same time, poetry had a solution of its own to the problem of induction. In Shelley’s view, poetry embodies knowledge itself at all levels, comprehending all science, and its reference point. The key to the concordance of the generality of science with the particularity of poetic experience (the counterpart of the number-fact) was metaphor, which transformed the particular into meaning (Poovey 1998:326). Poovey notes, but does not embrace, Shelly’s figural solution to the problem of the particular and the general, part and whole. She finds the problem unsolved throughout the long era of modernity only we renounce the desire for systematic knowledge for doubt, skepticism, uncertainty, can we escape this dilemma. Be that as it may, her discussion of the modern fact, the deracinated particular, which set aside and ignored the basic assumptions of ancient philosophy, points to a postmodern fact that in a similar way sets aside and ignores the problems and debate surrounding modern factuality (Poovey 1998:327-8). Historicizing the fact – indeed, distinguishing among the ancient, modern, and postmodern version – is troubling because it opens up for attention the constitution of the lexical level of conceptuality. In many languages, the lexicon determines what combination of meaningless elements. (such as letters) will count as words. In a social science. Some human affairs – say, public statements by leaders – may count as proper parts of the discourse. Other things, although human, like the daily digestive process of a person, do not. If the modern fact is seen as the product of a passing moment of time, like sartorial fashions or gender roles, the effect it create of a social that transcends and ideology is hard to maintain. It calls attention to the passing historically of concepts like society, power, value, or event. Because the disciplinary social sciences exist within the middle of conceptualization, the grammar and syntax of a system whose basic elements must be granted in order to play the game, attention to the constitution of basic terms would pose problems, even if their origins were not related to rhetorical and poetic discussion.
The “Science Effect” and the APA Publication Manual
At the opposite level of conceptual representation, the open semantic world, where the “meaning of it all” is asserted, other problems arise when historical questions are asked. Because the social sciences were established a century ago as non-ideological expressions of (modern) fact, dependent neither on Comtean or Marxist laws of historical process nor on the romantic tales of good and evil found in literary or religious accounts of human affairs, in theory at least, the only meaning that could be expressed by a responsible social science, that is, any meaning that is not dependent on ultimately ideological terms outside the grammatical/syntactic processes of the discipline, is found in the notion, “This is science,” in the broad sense of Wissenschaft, a disciplined study without value laden presuppositions. In order to achieve this sematic
ปราบปรามปัญหาใด ๆ อาจคลายของการตั้งชื่อที่เก็บข้อมูล ปัญหาที่อาจทำให้ไม่สามารถออกกำลังกาย จุดค้นหาความหมายหรือความหมายในความเป็นจริง เมื่อต้องการดูฮอโลคอสต์ เช่น เป็นเหตุการณ์ที่มีความหมายที่นอกเหนือจากประเทศ กลุ่ม polities ไอเดีย เทคโนโลยี หรือรูปแบบอื่น ๆ ของการศึกษาทางประวัติศาสตร์เหมาะสม อาจถือว่าศาสนา หรือลึกลับมันมุ่งสะท้อนความหมาย รูปแบบสูงสุด จึงอาจถือว่าจริงแต่ถ้าเน้นของถูกตามเรื่องต่ำ เช่นสิ่งแวดล้อมหรือผลกระทบจากพิษสารเคมี กรณีอดีตเป็นการค้นหาความหมายในความหมายที่สุดท้าย หลังมีหลากหลายองค์ประกอบในปทานุกรมทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่ไม่ใช่ประวัติศาสตร์ประเพณี บนมืออื่น ๆ วาทกรรมของความหมาย ระดับสูงสุด ความ หมาย ซึ่งเหตุการณ์แบบ multivarious ใช้บนรูปร่างชัดเจน และหลีกเลี่ยงไม่ได้ เกิดเป็นภัยคุกคามเท่าของวินัยที่เป็นไปได้ สำหรับในนิพจน์ที่ชัดเจนของระบบการควบคุมสามารถผลิต รูปร่างชัดเจนในอดีตสังคมและเส้นทางชัดเจนสำหรับอนาคตสังคมวางกองเป็นอุดมการณ์ที่ไม่สามารถยอมรับเฉพาะค่าความน่าเชื่อถือวินัย ดังนั้น คริสเตียน providentialism, Comtean positivism, Hegelian dialectic และนิยมวิภาษ Marxian ตกจากสังคมมีระเบียบวินัย มีลักษณะเด่นชัดที่ระดับ lexical กลายความหมายเป็นไปไม่ได้ เท่า ๆ กัน ไม่สามารถยอมรับได้ชัดเจน sematic ที่มีความหมายมากเกินไป Disciplinarily แล้วจะถูกจำกัดไปสองกลาง และระดับ ของการแสดง การไวยากรณ์ที่ syntactical มันคือมีกฎการใช้ประดิษฐาน และ explicated และนี้คืองานที่สาขาของการตรวจนับ จัดเรียง และพยายามมาก predesignated สินค้า ความหมายของการดำเนินงานเหล่านี้จะ ดาว ฤดูใบไม้ผลิจากกระบวนการเอง ไม่มีแอพลิเคชันของบางระบบ interpretive ภายนอกที่บุกรุกที่จะกล้าหาญ ผลกระทบของวิทยาศาสตร์และความจริงที่ทันสมัย The unquestioned lexical item of most social scientific work is the fact, the thing that is certain, demonstrated, and known. Yet factuality has a history, and as Mary Poovey has suggested, the modern fact (as opposed, say, to the ancient fact, or the postmodern fact) is to be distinguished from an earlier sort which was a reflection of metaphysical essences. Modern facts are empirical and recorded in the “transparent” language of numbers, although the telling of the relationship of fact and number is involved and equivocal. Double entry bookkeeping, itself related to sixteenth-century rhetorical, created a numbering of things that would change both politics and knowledge. Numerical expertise per se replaced that mercantile concreteness of the accountants; as this happened, the particulars of the accounting books came to be seen as “natural matter of fact” (Poovey 1998:29-91). By the 1830s the debate over numbering, or rather over induction from numbered things, saw a successful appeal to statistics, “a dull, dry parade of stupid figures,” against the “pathetic tales” of a literary sort; the value of the figures was precisely in their dullness, “a guarantee against the undue embellishment associated with fiction, hyperbole, and rhetoric” (Poovey 1998:313). The insoluble methodological problems of induction – how to move from number facts to general principles – were obscured by this triumph over fiction and rhetoric. At the same time, poetry had a solution of its own to the problem of induction. In Shelley’s view, poetry embodies knowledge itself at all levels, comprehending all science, and its reference point. The key to the concordance of the generality of science with the particularity of poetic experience (the counterpart of the number-fact) was metaphor, which transformed the particular into meaning (Poovey 1998:326). Poovey notes, but does not embrace, Shelly’s figural solution to the problem of the particular and the general, part and whole. She finds the problem unsolved throughout the long era of modernity only we renounce the desire for systematic knowledge for doubt, skepticism, uncertainty, can we escape this dilemma. Be that as it may, her discussion of the modern fact, the deracinated particular, which set aside and ignored the basic assumptions of ancient philosophy, points to a postmodern fact that in a similar way sets aside and ignores the problems and debate surrounding modern factuality (Poovey 1998:327-8). Historicizing the fact – indeed, distinguishing among the ancient, modern, and postmodern version – is troubling because it opens up for attention the constitution of the lexical level of conceptuality. In many languages, the lexicon determines what combination of meaningless elements. (such as letters) will count as words. In a social science. Some human affairs – say, public statements by leaders – may count as proper parts of the discourse. Other things, although human, like the daily digestive process of a person, do not. If the modern fact is seen as the product of a passing moment of time, like sartorial fashions or gender roles, the effect it create of a social that transcends and ideology is hard to maintain. It calls attention to the passing historically of concepts like society, power, value, or event. Because the disciplinary social sciences exist within the middle of conceptualization, the grammar and syntax of a system whose basic elements must be granted in order to play the game, attention to the constitution of basic terms would pose problems, even if their origins were not related to rhetorical and poetic discussion. The “Science Effect” and the APA Publication ManualAt the opposite level of conceptual representation, the open semantic world, where the “meaning of it all” is asserted, other problems arise when historical questions are asked. Because the social sciences were established a century ago as non-ideological expressions of (modern) fact, dependent neither on Comtean or Marxist laws of historical process nor on the romantic tales of good and evil found in literary or religious accounts of human affairs, in theory at least, the only meaning that could be expressed by a responsible social science, that is, any meaning that is not dependent on ultimately ideological terms outside the grammatical/syntactic processes of the discipline, is found in the notion, “This is science,” in the broad sense of Wissenschaft, a disciplined study without value laden presuppositions. In order to achieve this sematic
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