Security experts often advise users to use more than one
browser: one for surng the wild web and others for visit-
ing sensitive" web sites, such as online banking web sites
[1, 2]. This advice raises a number of questions. Can us-
ing more than one browser actually improve security? If
so, which properties are important? Can we realize these
security benets without resorting to the use of more than
one browser?
In this paper, we seek to answer these questions by crystal-
lizing two key security properties of using multiple browsers,
which we refer to as entry-point restriction and state isola-
tion. We nd that these two properties are responsible for
much of the security benet of using multiple browsers, and
we show how to achieve these security benets in a single
browser by letting web sites opt in to these behaviors.
Consider a user who diligently uses two browsers for secu-
rity. This user designates one browser as sensitive" and one
as
on-sensitive". She uses the sensitive browser only for
accessing her online bank (through known URLs and book-
marks) and refrains from visiting the general Web with the
sensitive browser. Meanwhile, she uses only the non-sensitive
browser for the rest of the Web and does not use it to visit
high-value sites.
Using two browsers in this manner does have security
benets. For example, consider the case of re
ected cross-site
scripting (XSS). In a re
ected XSS attack, the attacker crafts
a malicious URL containing an attack string and navigates
the user's browser to that URL, tricking the honest web site
into echoing back the attack string in a dangerous context.
The attack has more diculty succeeding if the user runs
more than one browser because the attack relies on which of
the user's browsers the attacker navigates. If the attacker
navigates the user's non-sensitive browser to a maliciously
crafted URL on the user's bank, the attack will have no
access to the user's banking-related state, which resides in
another browser.
From this discussion, one might conclude that isolation
of credentials and other state is the essential property that
makes using two browsers more secure. However, another
security property provided by using multiple browsers is
equally important: entry-point restriction. To illustrate
entry-point restriction by its absence, imagine if the attacker
could arbitrarily coordinate navigation of the users' two
browsers and open an arbitrary bank URL in the sensitive
Security experts often advise users to use more than onebrowser: one for sur ng the wild web and others for visit-ing sensitive" web sites, such as online banking web sites[1, 2]. This advice raises a number of questions. Can us-ing more than one browser actually improve security? Ifso, which properties are important? Can we realize thesesecurity bene ts without resorting to the use of more thanone browser?In this paper, we seek to answer these questions by crystal-lizing two key security properties of using multiple browsers,which we refer to as entry-point restriction and state isola-tion. We nd that these two properties are responsible formuch of the security bene t of using multiple browsers, andwe show how to achieve these security bene ts in a singlebrowser by letting web sites opt in to these behaviors.Consider a user who diligently uses two browsers for secu-rity. This user designates one browser as sensitive" and oneas
on-sensitive". She uses the sensitive browser only foraccessing her online bank (through known URLs and book-marks) and refrains from visiting the general Web with thesensitive browser. Meanwhile, she uses only the non-sensitivebrowser for the rest of the Web and does not use it to visithigh-value sites.Using two browsers in this manner does have securitybene ts. For example, consider the case of reected cross-sitescripting (XSS). In a reected XSS attack, the attacker craftsURL ที่เป็นอันตรายประกอบด้วยสตริงโจมตี และนำทางยังเบราว์เซอร์ของผู้ใช้ไปที่ URL หลอกเว็บไซต์ซื่อสัตย์เป็นการพักสายโจมตีในบริบทที่เป็นอันตรายมีการเพิ่มเติม di culty ประสบความสำเร็จถ้าผู้โจมตีเบราว์เซอร์มากกว่าหนึ่ง เพราะการโจมตีใช้ว่าเบราว์เซอร์ของผู้ใช้ที่นำทางยังผู้โจมตี หากผู้โจมตีเบราว์เซอร์ไม่ลับของผู้ใช้เพื่อนำทางยังมีเจตนาURL ที่สร้างขึ้นในธนาคารของผู้ใช้ การโจมตีจะไม่มีเข้าถึงของผู้ใช้ที่เกี่ยวข้องกับธนาคารรัฐ ซึ่งอยู่ในเบราเซอร์อื่นจากคำอธิบายนี้ หนึ่งอาจสรุปที่แยกข้อมูลประจำตัวและอื่น ๆ รัฐเป็นคุณสมบัติสำคัญที่ทำให้ใช้สองเบราว์เซอร์ที่ปลอดภัยมากขึ้น อย่างไรก็ตาม อื่นความปลอดภัยโดยใช้เบราว์เซอร์หลายแห่งสิ่งสำคัญ: จุดจำกัด เพื่อแสดง-จุดจำกัด โดยการขาดงาน จินตนาการถ้าผู้โจมตีโดยสามารถประสานงานการนำทางของผู้ใช้ที่สองเบราว์เซอร์และเปิด URL ในตรงตามธนาคารกำหนด
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