Box 5:
‘DEVELOPMENT FOR PEACE’ – LESSONS FROM SRI LANKA
After an indefinite ceasefire in 2002, the Government of
Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
made the achievement of rapid ‘peace dividends’ the first
priority of their talks. These efforts targeted the economic
reconstruction of the North-East as well as the strengthening
of Sri Lanka’s overall economic development. From a conflict
resolution perspective, talking about economic development
was intended in order to dissipate tensions between the parties
and broaden the constituency for peace before entering into
more contentious political or military issues.
In Sri Lanka, this ‘development for peace’ approach rested
on a shared agenda between the parties, albeit temporarily:
The government promised its electorate an economic recovery
and, by making it a priority, hoped to ensure its political survival
after the elections; the LTTE wanted to satisfy urgent
humanitarian and material needs of North-Eastern populations,
thereby re-enforcing its role as a de-facto authority and
strengthening the legitimacy of its claim for regional autonomy.
The international development community’s quick response
to the situation in June 2003 raised USD 4.5 billion at a donor
conference in Tokyo. While the funds were tied to progress
in the peace process, the Tokyo package did not specify
progress measures, mechanisms for enforcing compliance,
or governance arrangements to allocate and disburse aid.
It therefore had a limited effectiveness in advancing the peace
process and was held to illustrate the flawed assumption that
economic incentives could override political imperatives.
Ultimately, development assistance was unable to change the
parties’ political agendas. As their temporary conversion of
interests on economic development subsided, the political
and military incompatibility resurfaced and negotiations were
suspended. A crucial ingredient for ‘development for peace’
is therefore a strong political commitment to end the conflict.
In cases in which the parties engage in peace talks for other
ends – such as strengthening constituency support or improving
military conditions – ‘development for peace’ is likely to be
nothing more than lip-service. It is therefore important to
understand the attitudes of the parties towards a peace
process when structuring aid incentives. Otherwise, having
a carrot in front of the peace cart has no effects because
the horses that are supposed to pull it have left.