well as with more IT-experienced senior managers are less likely to have IT material weaknesses in the ICOFR, which support our H2a, H2b and H3. The coefficients of CEOCFOIT are not
significant in two regressions, providing no support for H1.
We also find that companies with a higher percentage of independent directors are less likely to have IT control material weaknesses, supporting our H4. The number of audit committee
members with IT-related experience is also negative and marginally significant in one of the models, indicating that the IT experience of audit committee members may help companies build strong IT control, although this relationship becomes insignificant when CIOYR is included in the model. Thus, H5 is only partially supported. For control variables, companies with non-Big 4 auditors, CEOs serving as the chairman of the
board, higher leverage, lower growth rates, and higher adjusted audit fees are more likely to have IT material weaknesses.
well as with more IT-experienced senior managers are less likely to have IT material weaknesses in the ICOFR, which support our H2a, H2b and H3. The coefficients of CEOCFOIT are notsignificant in two regressions, providing no support for H1.We also find that companies with a higher percentage of independent directors are less likely to have IT control material weaknesses, supporting our H4. The number of audit committeemembers with IT-related experience is also negative and marginally significant in one of the models, indicating that the IT experience of audit committee members may help companies build strong IT control, although this relationship becomes insignificant when CIOYR is included in the model. Thus, H5 is only partially supported. For control variables, companies with non-Big 4 auditors, CEOs serving as the chairman of theboard, higher leverage, lower growth rates, and higher adjusted audit fees are more likely to have IT material weaknesses.
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