By digging deeper into the issue of double majorities, one can bring an interesting argument. First, concerning the entire parliamentary two-third majority (the first supermajority required), a two-third majority is somewhat beyond the number of MPs required to build a coalition government. In this context, an absolute majority in Parliament (50 percent + one) could appoint both the Government and the President of Republic in the final process. Hence, logically and politically, a governmental coalition would never be close or equal to two-thirds of MPs. With this in mind, the first majority required to adopt a constitutional amendment, seeks to set forth a parliamentary bar or threshold that exceeds the coalition of parties that usually hold the Government. Therefore, as far as a majority of two-thirds of the votes in Parliament is required for the adoption of a constitutional amendment, a coalition government would not be able to satisfy this condition alone, at least logically and practically, even though the idea of having a coalition government consisting of two-thirds of MPs is not impossible. To this extent, the supermajority of two-thirds of Parliament, required to pass a constitutional amendment could not be a monopoly of the ruling coalition government. Instead, a broader consensus, with parties that stand outside the coalition government is needed. Second, concerning the two-thirds of minority MPs required to pass a constitutional amendment (the second supermajority required), it represents a supermajority that is both broad and rather inclusive in terms of ethnic minorities represented in the Kosovo Parliament. A two-thirds majority of ethnic minority MPs, in fact, exceeds the number of seats that Serbs alone have in the current composition of Parliament. It means that, a two-thirds majority at the level of ethnic minority MPs is not a monopoly of Serbian MPs alone, with Serbs being the largest ethnic minority in Kosovo. This, therefore, suggests that the two-thirds minority MPs’ vote in Parliament is neither a prerogative of one ethnic community’s MPs, say Serbian MPs, nor an easily reachable bar from the perspective of other ethnic communities’ MPs. However, can the Kosovo Parliament remain without any ethnic minority MP and dismiss the supermajority required? No, the Kosovo Constitution offers twenty reserved seats for ethnic minority MPs, regardless of the popular vote results. The model of constitutional amendment provided by the provision concerned follows a power-sharing rationale, as does the entire Kosovo Constitution.