According to the results, we can conclude in the context of the strategic interactions that monetary policy could play a dominant role in the case of the Czech Republic. The results show a statistically significant reaction of fiscal policy to monetary policy and vice versa, however, monetary policy does not react to fiscal policy. In the case of Slo- vakia, the relations were negative in both cases, which would mean that monetary and fiscal policies are in a reciprocal conflict and both of them do not consider one another. It has not been confirmed by a statistical significance (1%, 5% or 10% significance level). As well as in the case of Poland, statistically significant reactions on each other have not been confirmed. None of these policies takes into consideration (in a setting of their economic political instrument) statistically significant reaction to the other one’s behaviour. Hungarian results are very similar to those of the Czech Republic. In the model of the reaction function of the fiscal policy, the variable representing the mone- tary policy was significant. In the case of the reaction function of monetary policy, however, the variable representing fiscal policy was not significant. When considering sequential decision making, we can conclude that Hungarian monetary policy can play a dominant role.