Some countries begin to show definite signs of economic recovery in the second half of 1998, just as other countries are experiencing the full effects of the crisis. For example, the Korean index we use reaches a low point of 23.6 at the end of September, but recovers to 53.1 by the end of the year. In our main regressions we therefore look at the lowest point in the stock market during 1998 to measure how far the market falls as a result of the crisis. We also check our results using the end of 1998 as an alternative end point.
In terms of the model, our empirical tests assume that R and α are constant across countries. We test whether k, as measured by corporate governance variables, has an independent impact. This assumption is reasonable to a first approximation because the anecdotal evidence suggests there was a similar shock across all emerging markets. Most of the essays in Hunter et al. (1999) argue or assume that there was a similar shock of some kind across all emerging markets (see also Biers, 1998). We do not know if the size of this initial shock to confidence was exactly the same in all countries, but the evidence indicates both that the initial loss of confidence was small and that, at least in fall 1997, almost every emerging market was affected (International Monetary Fund, 1997.) It is possible that the shock was larger in countries with weaker institutions for reasons that are unrelated to institutions. However, there is no evidence of such a pattern to the shock. The anecdotal evidence suggests that there was a small loss of investor confidence that began in Thailand, spread through Asia, and then suddenly included other emerging markets, marked by a surprising sell-off in Hong Kong from October 1997. By November 1997 there had been some small loss of confidence or questioning of future prospects in almost all emerging markets.