9Barings and the Bank of England had rules that limited credit exposures. Large exposures to any customer were supposed to be limited to 25% of Barings’ equity. In a remarkable breach of regulations, the Bank of England gave Barings an “informal concession” to temporarily exceed this limit. As a result, the Bank of England was not notified when Barings exposure to the OSA reached 73% of its equity, and the bank’s exposure to the SIMEX reached 40% of equity. See Bank of England, Bank of England Report on the Collapse of Barings. Available at: http://www.numa.com/ref/barings/bar00.htm (18 July 1995). 10Financial leverage gave Leeson the ability to lay claim to assets with borrowed funds or by depositing margin with brokers. Leverage amplified his gains and losses from what they would have been had 100% of the assets’ value been purchased with Barings’ own funds.