Israel pursued negotiations on both tracks simultaneously, although the members of the official delegation were not aware of the Oslo channel. On the Palestinian side, however, there were great difficulties with internal coordination. The PLO's strategy was to block the official negotiations in Washington so as to promote direct Israel-PLO negotiations. The official Palestinian delegation therefore received inconsistent instructions were issued. The PLO wanted to demonstrate to Israel that greater flexibility and greater concession were possible in the secret back channel. The Palestinian negotiations in Oslo informed their Israeli counterparts that the official Palestinian delegation had been told to negotiate only on general issues, and asked the Israelis not to raise any issues in Washington that had not been agreed upon in Oslo. When the official Palestinian delegation did not receive a mandate to discuss U. S. proposals and present counter proposals, they asked Arafat whether a back channel existed; Arafat denied it. In August 1993, however, the official delegation went to Tunis to offer their resignation; they felt they could not continue negotiations with such conflicting instructions and lack of coherent strategies.