ASEAN and EU
The European Union (EU) and the ASEAN are just a decade apart. However, EU has a far more sophisticated institutional structure and more democratic governance processes, making it worlds apart with ASEAN. This, even though both blocs engaged in reform measures almost around the same time. While ASEAN was working for its Charter, EU was pursuing the Treaty of Lisbon, which is also known as Reform Treaty. While ASEAN is stuck with consensus and non-interference as key principles, the EU has been quite vocal on the human rights situation in Central and Eastern European states. EU may also impose penalty and even expulsion to recalcitrant members. One of the results of the reform treaty was the qualified majority voting (QMV) where voting weights corresponds with the countries’ population. According to EU Ambassador to the Philippines Alistair MacDonald, the Reform Treaty further strengthened the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in decision-making; it created the post of president of the European Council; and it created the office of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The treaty also retired the usage of the “European Community,” as EU takes on a legal personality Unlike ASEAN, the EU has structures such as the parliament, Supreme Court and court of appeals which “which ASEAN may or may not yet aspire.” The EU also has a civil society mechanism that is called right of citizen’s initiative. Civil society organizations (CSOs) may submit a proposal to the EU for as long as this is backed by one million signatures. It is generally believed that the developments at the EU triggered the formulation of ASEAN’s Charter. After all, both regional blocs were largely established for trade and security issues. One of the issues which tailed the pre and post ASEAN Charter process was the controversial EU-ASEAN free trade agreement, which basically intends to liberalize “substantially all goods and services,” including those which civil society bitterly fought at the World Trade Organization (WTO) such as government procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy. Although much of the EUASEAN FTA remains pending, one danger is that the EU might veer away from the regional track and instead further pursue bilateral with individual ASEAN members. The EU remains a major trading partner of ASEAN, bringing in more than 100 billion Euros. It also contributes 25 per cent of investments worth US$13 billion in ASEAN.
Such nature has nonetheless translated into breakthroughs towards stronger diplomatic ties. As Michael Vatikiotis puts it, “One can quibble about the effectiveness of ASEAN as a vehicle for concrete economic cooperation but it cannot be denied that by using diplomatic rather than military means, as well as a style of diplomacy based on indigenous rather than imported principles, ASEAN has succeeded in fostering a greater sense of regional unity and security.”2 One more recent example of such breakthrough happened in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis which devastated Burma. The junta earned condemnation when it refused to allow foreign aid, including those in ships which were just docked on ports and relief workers. However it relented to ASEAN which eventually formed an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force that provided advice to the Tripartite Core Group (TCG). TCG consisted of ASEAN, Burma and United Nations. The Task Force and the TCG distributed much relief and conducted an assessment of the damages as well as cost of reconstruction and recovery. The assessment involved the World Bank and the ADB and a few CSOs. As UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes described, “Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the Special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government.”3 But because ASEAN is largely composed of countries with questionable human rights track record and repressive policies especially towards the civil society organizations and the media, it could hardly put its foot down on atrocious developments within the bloc such as Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor and the junta’s order for the continuing detention of Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The ASEAN initiative for the postNargis relief and reconstruction was also viewed rather late, especially with the massive devastation the cyclone left.
ADB in Burma
Burma has been in arrears with the ADB. Its last loan with the bank was drawn in 1986 while its last technical assistance was in 1987. Although Burma’s financial mess has been ADB’s convenient response regarding its engagement with the country and its junta, the Bank has never let its eye wander off Burma’s strategic position and extremely rich natural resources. Regional programs and political blocs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the ASEAN has been the bank’s way of making inroads to the country. Under the GMS for instance, Burma has been included in the East-West economic corridor which passes by Vietnam, Laos and Thailand before it reaches Burma. It has been widely noted that while connectivity projects may facilitate trade, they also render communities more vulnerable to poverty, especially when these communities are not consulted in the first place and eventually evicted from their traditional sources of livelihood and even more exposed to communicable diseases such as HIV-AIDS. ADB also included Burma in the GMS Power Grid, whose capacity is partly sourced from Burma’s Salween River. But even without the GMS, ADB is said to be actively sending “consultative missions” to Burma. Moreover, Burma is still included in ADB’s economic projections and other studies. Groups like the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) urged the ADB to refrain from providing any form of assistance as this only tend to legitimize the ruling junta. ALTSEAN Burma likewise shared this view. But it also asked the ADB to be very transparent in its dealings with Burma, especially if the private sector is involved in a project. In the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, SWAN, along with several other organizations such as the Ethnic Community Development Forum, Burma River Network, Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand, Karen Environment and Social Action Network, Nationalities Youth Forum, Salween Watch Coalition and Shan Youth Power urged both the ADB and the World Bank to include communities in any decision-making in any activities of the banks in the country, especially as local organizations cannot freely express their opinions due to security threats. The said groups are mostly based in Thailand but have broad contacts with organizations inside Burma. So far, Burma has 32 loans with the bank, amounting to US$ 530.86. According to the ADB, it “continues to monitor economic developments in Myanmar, and an operational strategy will be formulated when appropriate. Close coordination is being maintained with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and UNDP, with emphasis on assessing the government’s economic reform program and recommended policy actions. Liaison is also being maintained with Myanmar’s major bilateral donors regarding the status of their assistance programs.”
Meanwhile, the ADB was founded in 1966 with the goal of spurring development in post-war Asia. As its Charter states, the bank aimed at “foster[ing] economic growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the Far East and…contribut[ing] to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing member countries in the region, collectively and individually.”4 ADB is primarily a Japanese creation. Although quite discredited after the Second World War, Japan has kept its vision of an Asia for Asians, which had its revival with the rise of nation-states in the region in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thus, in the same fashion as the founding of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), Japan launched the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Even as the United States (US) and members of the European Union tend to counterbalance Japan’s stake in the bank, the Japanese Finance Ministry has always nominated and appointed the ADB’s president. As Michael Wesley wrote in the American Review, “Its central metaphor is the ‘flying geese’ pattern of East Asian development, in which successively larger numbers of East Asian states adopt and adapt the developmental state model and follow its earliest founders along a rapid development path.” 5 To a certain extent, ADB was born at the right moment, when Asia and the Pacific were exhausting its internal capacities and external resources, other than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But the bank rather tempered its regional approach at the beginning. Thus in its 1967 Annual Report, it explained that “There were opportunities as well as complexities in a regionalized approach to financing operations but that financing of national development projects may in itself promote, in due course, the economic growth of the region as a whole.”6 Although ADB and ASEAN were born around the same time, it was only in 1976 when ADB took interest in ASEAN, following the latter’s first Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Back in the 1970s, ADB accounted a mere five per cent of the external resource flows into the five original ASEAN members. However it is telling that Asas early as the 1970s, ADB somehow knew that the strategic way to engage with ASEAN is to not to deal with it as a whole. As ADB’s Chief Economist Seiji Naya wrote in 1982_, “Some businessmen [sic] in ASEAN have expressed impatience with the slow progress of the government-sponsored regional industrial projects, the preferential trade arrangements and the region
อาเซียนและสหภาพยุโรป อาเซียนและสหภาพยุโรป (EU) มีเพียงทศวรรษที่ผ่านมาห่างกัน อย่างไรก็ตาม ใน EU ได้โครงสร้างสถาบันมีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้นและกระบวนการปกครองประชาธิปไตยมากขึ้น ทำให้โลกแยกกับอาเซียน นี้ แม้ว่า blocs ทั้งหมั้นในมาตรการปฏิรูปเกือบรอบเวลาเดียวกัน ในขณะที่อาเซียนทำงานสำหรับการเช่าเหมาลำ EU ได้ใฝ่หาสนธิสัญญาลิสบอน ซึ่งเรียกว่าสนธิสัญญาปฏิรูปการ ในขณะที่อาเซียนติดอยู่กับมติและไม่รบกวนเป็นหลักสำคัญ EU ได้รับค่อนข้าง vocal สถานการณ์สิทธิมนุษยชนในอเมริกากลางและยุโรปตะวันออก EU ยังอาจกำหนดโทษและขับไล่แม้ recalcitrant สมาชิก ผลของสนธิสัญญาปฏิรูปคนส่วนใหญ่มีคุณสมบัติ (QMV) การลงคะแนนเสียงที่ลงคะแนนเสียงน้ำหนักสอดคล้องกับประชากรของประเทศ ตาม EU ประจำแมคโดนัลด์ Alistair ฟิลิปปินส์ สนธิสัญญาปฏิรูปเพิ่มเติมความเข้มแข็งบทบาทของรัฐสภายุโรปและ parliaments แห่งชาติตัดสินใจ ขึ้นลงประธานสภายุโรป และได้สร้างสำนักสูงพนักงานในต่างประเทศและนโยบายความปลอดภัย สนธิยังถอนการใช้งานของ "สหภาพยุโรป เป็น EU จะในกฎหมายลักษณะต่างจากอาเซียน EU มีโครงสร้างเช่นรัฐสภา ศาลฎีกา และศาลอุทธรณ์ของ"อาเซียนที่อาจ หรืออาจไม่ aspire ยัง " นอกจากนี้ EU ยังมีกลไกภาคประชาสังคมที่เรียกว่าสิทธิของความคิดริเริ่มของประชาชน องค์กรภาคประชาสังคม (CSOs) อาจส่งข้อเสนอไปยัง EU สำหรับตราบเท่าที่นี้มีสำรอง โดยลายเซ็นหนึ่งล้าน โดยทั่วไปเชื่อกันว่า การพัฒนาที่ EU ทริกเกอร์กำหนดกฎบัตรของอาเซียน หลังทั้งหมด ทั้งสอง blocs ภูมิภาคส่วนใหญ่ก่อปัญหาทางการค้าและความปลอดภัย ประเด็นที่หางกระบวนการกฎบัตรอาเซียนก่อนและหลังถูกแย้งสหภาพยุโรปอาเซียนค้าเสรีข้อตกลง ซึ่งโดยทั่วไปมี liberalize "มากทุกสินค้าและบริการ รวมถึงผู้ที่สังคมพิรี้พิไรสู้ในโลกค้าองค์กร (องค์การ) เช่นการจัดซื้อจัดจ้างของรัฐบาล นโยบายการแข่งขันและอำนวยความสะดวกค้าการ แม้ว่ามากของเขตการค้าเสรี EUASEAN ยังคงอยู่ระหว่างการพิจารณา อันตรายหนึ่งคือ EU อาจหันเหจากการติดตามระดับภูมิภาค และแทน เพิ่มเติมไล่ระดับทวิภาคีกับอาเซียนแต่ละ EU ยังคง เป็นคู่ค้าสำคัญของอาเซียน การนำในกว่า 100 พันล้านยูโร นอกจากนี้ยังจัดสรรร้อยละ 25 ของเงินลงทุนมูลค่า 13 พันล้านเหรียญสหรัฐฯ ในอาเซียนธรรมชาติดังกล่าวมีแปลกระนั้นเป็นนวัตกรรมใหม่ต่อความสัมพันธ์ทางการทูตที่แข็งแกร่ง ขณะที่ Michael Vatikiotis ทำให้มัน "หนึ่งสามารถเล่นลิ้นเกี่ยวกับประสิทธิผลของอาเซียนเป็นพาหนะสำหรับคอนกรีตความร่วมมือทางเศรษฐกิจ แต่ไม่ปฏิเสธว่า โดยทางการทูตแทนการหมายถึงทหาร เป็นลักษณะของการทูตตามหลักพื้นเมือง มากกว่านำเข้า อาเซียนประสบความสำเร็จในความสามัคคีที่ภูมิภาคและความปลอดภัยมากขึ้น" 2 ตัวอย่างล่าสุดที่หนึ่งของความก้าวหน้าดังกล่าวเกิดขึ้นผลพวงของพายุไซซึ่งทำลายพม่า ยึดที่ได้ลงโทษเมื่อนั้นปฏิเสธที่จะให้ความช่วยเหลือต่างประเทศ รวมทั้งผู้ที่อยู่ในเรือซึ่งมีเพียงย้ายพอร์ตและบรรเทาแรงงาน อย่างไรก็ตาม มัน relented กับอาเซียนที่เกิดขึ้นในที่สุดแรงงานมนุษยธรรมอาเซียนที่ให้คำแนะนำไปแบบ Tripartite Core กลุ่ม (TCG) TCG ประกอบด้วยพม่า อาเซียน และสหประชาชาติ แรงงานและ TCG แจกจ่ายบรรเทาทุกข์มาก และดำเนินการประเมินความเสียหายและต้นทุนของการฟื้นฟูและกู้คืน การประเมินเกี่ยวข้องกับธนาคารโลก และ ADB และ CSOs กี่ เป็นผู้ประสานงานบรรเทา UN ฉุกเฉิน จอห์นโฮลมส์อธิบาย "ไซพบเราแบบใหม่ของการร่วมมือด้านมนุษยธรรม เพิ่มตำแหน่งพิเศษและความสามารถของสมาคมประชาชาติแห่งเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ของสหประชาชาติในการทำงานอย่างมีประสิทธิภาพกับรัฐบาล" 3 แต่เนื่องจากอาเซียนจะประกอบด้วยส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศที่มีการบันทึกติดตามแก้แค้นคืนสิทธิมนุษยชนและนโยบายกดขี่โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งต่อองค์กรภาคประชาสังคมและสื่อมวลชน มันอาจไม่ใส่ของเท้าลงพัฒนาบ่อนทำลายความมั่นคงภายในค่ายเช่นอินโดนีเซียยึดครองติมอร์ตะวันออกและยึดการสั่งขังต่อเนื่องของผู้นำพม่าอองซานซูจี ความคิดริเริ่มอาเซียน postNargis บรรเทาและฟื้นฟูถูกยังดูค่อนข้างดึก โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งกับหลังใหญ่พายุหมุนซ้ายADB ในพม่า Burma has been in arrears with the ADB. Its last loan with the bank was drawn in 1986 while its last technical assistance was in 1987. Although Burma’s financial mess has been ADB’s convenient response regarding its engagement with the country and its junta, the Bank has never let its eye wander off Burma’s strategic position and extremely rich natural resources. Regional programs and political blocs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the ASEAN has been the bank’s way of making inroads to the country. Under the GMS for instance, Burma has been included in the East-West economic corridor which passes by Vietnam, Laos and Thailand before it reaches Burma. It has been widely noted that while connectivity projects may facilitate trade, they also render communities more vulnerable to poverty, especially when these communities are not consulted in the first place and eventually evicted from their traditional sources of livelihood and even more exposed to communicable diseases such as HIV-AIDS. ADB also included Burma in the GMS Power Grid, whose capacity is partly sourced from Burma’s Salween River. But even without the GMS, ADB is said to be actively sending “consultative missions” to Burma. Moreover, Burma is still included in ADB’s economic projections and other studies. Groups like the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) urged the ADB to refrain from providing any form of assistance as this only tend to legitimize the ruling junta. ALTSEAN Burma likewise shared this view. But it also asked the ADB to be very transparent in its dealings with Burma, especially if the private sector is involved in a project. In the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, SWAN, along with several other organizations such as the Ethnic Community Development Forum, Burma River Network, Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand, Karen Environment and Social Action Network, Nationalities Youth Forum, Salween Watch Coalition and Shan Youth Power urged both the ADB and the World Bank to include communities in any decision-making in any activities of the banks in the country, especially as local organizations cannot freely express their opinions due to security threats. The said groups are mostly based in Thailand but have broad contacts with organizations inside Burma. So far, Burma has 32 loans with the bank, amounting to US$ 530.86. According to the ADB, it “continues to monitor economic developments in Myanmar, and an operational strategy will be formulated when appropriate. Close coordination is being maintained with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and UNDP, with emphasis on assessing the government’s economic reform program and recommended policy actions. Liaison is also being maintained with Myanmar’s major bilateral donors regarding the status of their assistance programs.”Meanwhile, the ADB was founded in 1966 with the goal of spurring development in post-war Asia. As its Charter states, the bank aimed at “foster[ing] economic growth and co-operation in the region of Asia and the Far East and…contribut[ing] to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing member countries in the region, collectively and individually.”4 ADB is primarily a Japanese creation. Although quite discredited after the Second World War, Japan has kept its vision of an Asia for Asians, which had its revival with the rise of nation-states in the region in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thus, in the same fashion as the founding of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), Japan launched the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Even as the United States (US) and members of the European Union tend to counterbalance Japan’s stake in the bank, the Japanese Finance Ministry has always nominated and appointed the ADB’s president. As Michael Wesley wrote in the American Review, “Its central metaphor is the ‘flying geese’ pattern of East Asian development, in which successively larger numbers of East Asian states adopt and adapt the developmental state model and follow its earliest founders along a rapid development path.” 5 To a certain extent, ADB was born at the right moment, when Asia and the Pacific were exhausting its internal capacities and external resources, other than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But the bank rather tempered its regional approach at the beginning. Thus in its 1967 Annual Report, it explained that “There were opportunities as well as complexities in a regionalized approach to financing operations but that financing of national development projects may in itself promote, in due course, the economic growth of the region as a whole.”6 Although ADB and ASEAN were born around the same time, it was only in 1976 when ADB took interest in ASEAN, following the latter’s first Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Back in the 1970s, ADB accounted a mere five per cent of the external resource flows into the five original ASEAN members. However it is telling that Asas early as the 1970s, ADB somehow knew that the strategic way to engage with ASEAN is to not to deal with it as a whole. As ADB’s Chief Economist Seiji Naya wrote in 1982_, “Some businessmen [sic] in ASEAN have expressed impatience with the slow progress of the government-sponsored regional industrial projects, the preferential trade arrangements and the region
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