correct strategic line for the international Communist movement was no longer one of passive "peaceful coexistence" but one of active revolutionary advance. Coming at a time of frustration and sagging hopes in North Vietnam undertaking to achieve national unification by "peaceful means, this strategic estimate must have struck a responsive chord in Ho Chi Minh, who tarried a month in Peiping before returning home from the Moscow Conference. As the events of the ensuing two years were to demonstrate, Communist China and North Vietnam would act in concert on the implications of this assessment
by adopting a more aggressive policy in pursuit of revolutionary goals i n South Vietnam and Laos. As these events would also demonstrate, Idoscow's differing Strategic estimate and its reluctance to become involved in Southeast Asia would align 1
the North Vietnamese regime behind Peiping on a number of issues in the worsening Sino-Soviet,dispute in the latter months of 1959