The second wave: 1946-1976
During the second wave, Argentina entered into rapid cycles of alternating authoritarian and competitive regimes. From 1946 to 1951, 1958 to 1962, 1963 to 1966, and 1973 to 1976, the county had four short-lived competitive periods, leading to successively more repressive dictatorships. After 1943, the authoritarian regimes were also short-loved. What explains why competitive regimes were not able to last despite Argentina’s moderately high level of development and moderately low inequality?
In addition, the actors that did have a normative preference for dictatorship did not share the same view of what kind of dictatorship they wanted. President Juan Peron had a normative preference for a populist authoritarian regime. After being overthrown in 1955, Peron gradually left behind his normative preference for authoritarian populism. In the 1960, one faction of the military became attached to the view that it was uniquely qualified to develop Argentina and that a right-wing military dictatorship was the best possible from of government. In 1969, a leftist guerrilla group emerged, committed to revolutionary socialism. And in the 1970s, right-wing terrorist groups emerged; they, too, had a normative preference for dictatorship. But these actors had radically opposing preferences regarding the kind of dictatorship and the kind of policies they sought. They all worked to subvert competitive and authoritarian regimes, but they were incapable of forming a stable authoritarian coalition. O’Donnell (1973) famously called this cycle of unstable authoritarian and competitive regimes “an impossible game.” Reflecting on this era, Huntington (1968:82) claimed that Argentina’s distinguishing characteristic was “the fragility and fleetness of all forms of authority.”
As one attempt after another failed, some actors attempted to impose more radical solutions to Argentina’s dual problems of regime instability and economic disappointment.
Juan. D. Peron, 1946-51
General Uriburu’s dictatorship lasted only until 1932. In 1931, he convoked elections, and from 1932 until 1943, Argentina had three presidents including two elected in fraudulent contests. A military coup in June 1943 put an end to the notoriously fraudulent regime of 1932-43. The 1943-46 dictatorship anticipated the nationalistic, statist, and antiliberal policies of Juan Peron’s government from 1946 to 1955.
As occurred in many Latin American countries, the end of World War II opened the door for some democratizing impulses including-in Argentina-the military government’s decision to hold elections in 1946. Peron was elected president by a handsome margin in largely free and fair competitive elections. His arrival to a high-level position in national politics dated back to 1943, when he was one of the leaders of the coup that ended the 1932-43 regime. He served as secretary of labor and vice-president and secretary of war. His administration forged a lasting alliance with the labor movement, established numerous welfare programs, and expanded social rights. At the same time, it progressively dismantled independent institutions and civil liberties in order to create a populist authoritarian regime.
Arturo Frondizi, 1958-62
The 1955 coup that removed peron began a lengthy period of instability in Argentine politics that lasted until 1983, with nineteen presidents in twenty-eight years. Competitive regimes and dictatorships alike were subject to rapid erosion and breakdown.
After three years of military rule(1955-58), Argentina returned to competitive politics in 1958 when the military government withdrew from power and sponsored elections. Even though the elections represented a fair contest for the candidates allowed to participate, they were marredin terms of democratic principles by the proscription of the Peronists. The duros within the armed forces and their civilian allies including aprominent part of the UCR preferred the radical suppression of Peronists. Moreover, the virulent anti-Peronism of President Pedro Aramburu contributed to Peronist radicalization.
If they had been allowed to run, Peronists would have won the elections an outcome that was unacceptable to the actors of the coalition that overthrew Peron in 1955. Because of the proscription of the largest party, the competitive regime established in 1958 was born with a congenial defect. The conservative’s fear of Peronism was a huge contributing factor to what O’Donnell called “the impossible game”: no government, whether authoritarian or semi-democratic, could create a stable governing coalition from 1955 to 1973.
Arturo Illia, 1963-66
Shortly after the March 1962 coup, deep divisions within the military came to the surface. The factions that favored a quick return to competitive politics won out, leading to new general elections in July 1963. The proscription of the Peronists meant that the new semi-democratic regime had the same congenital defect as the regime of 1958-62. This time Peron ordered his followers to cast a blank vote, and Arturo Illia of the URCP won the presidential election with a meager 25 percent of the popular vote. He assumed office in October 1963.
Illia had a democratic temperament, and he governed with a democratic spirit even when he faced disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions. Against the hopes of conservatives, business interests, and the military, he refused to use repression even in the face of workers’ factory takeovers in May 1964. The government avoided radical policies and had a decidedly moderate agenda. According to Viola (1982:87), the freedom of expression and organization during this was unprecedented since 1946. The government even lifted electoral proscriptions against Peronist candidates in 1965. But much as occurred with Frondizi, the actors with a steadfast normative preference for democracy were few and far between – Ilia and his party were the sole exception. And once again, a pro-coup coalition gathered momentum quickly. Finally, on June 28, 1966, a military coup deposed President Illia.
คลื่นที่สอง: 1946-1976 ระหว่างคลื่นที่สอง อาร์เจนติน่าเข้ารอบอย่างรวดเร็วของสลับระบอบประเทศ และแข่งขัน จาก 1946 ถึง 1951, 1958 ถึง 1962, 1963-1966 และ 1973 ถึง 1976 เขตได้ 4 ช่วงสั้น ๆ แข่งขันรอบ นำไปสู่โปอดกลั้นมากขึ้นติด ๆ กัน หลังจาก 1943 ระบอบประเทศก็ยังสั้นรัก อะไรอธิบายทำไมระบอบแข่งขันไม่ สามารถล่าสุดแม้ของอาร์เจนตินาพัฒนาค่อนข้างสูงระดับค่อนข้างต่ำความไม่เท่าเทียมกันหรือไม่ In addition, the actors that did have a normative preference for dictatorship did not share the same view of what kind of dictatorship they wanted. President Juan Peron had a normative preference for a populist authoritarian regime. After being overthrown in 1955, Peron gradually left behind his normative preference for authoritarian populism. In the 1960, one faction of the military became attached to the view that it was uniquely qualified to develop Argentina and that a right-wing military dictatorship was the best possible from of government. In 1969, a leftist guerrilla group emerged, committed to revolutionary socialism. And in the 1970s, right-wing terrorist groups emerged; they, too, had a normative preference for dictatorship. But these actors had radically opposing preferences regarding the kind of dictatorship and the kind of policies they sought. They all worked to subvert competitive and authoritarian regimes, but they were incapable of forming a stable authoritarian coalition. O’Donnell (1973) famously called this cycle of unstable authoritarian and competitive regimes “an impossible game.” Reflecting on this era, Huntington (1968:82) claimed that Argentina’s distinguishing characteristic was “the fragility and fleetness of all forms of authority.” As one attempt after another failed, some actors attempted to impose more radical solutions to Argentina’s dual problems of regime instability and economic disappointment. Juan D. Peron, 1946-51เผด็จการทั่วไป Uriburu กินเวลาจนถึงปี 1932 ในปี 1931 เขา convoked เลือกตั้ง และจากปี 1932 จนถึง 1943 อาร์เจนติน่ามีสามประธานาธิบดีทั้งสองเลือกในการแข่งขันที่หลอกลวง การรัฐประหารในเดือน 1943 มิถุนายนตัดระบอบฉาวปลอมของ 1932-43 เผด็จ 1943-46 คาดว่าจะ nationalistic, statist และนโยบาย antiliberal ของ Juan Peron รัฐบาลจาก 1946 1955 เกิดขึ้นในประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกาละติน จุดสิ้นสุดของสงครามโลกครั้งที่สองเปิดประตูสำหรับแรงกระตุ้นบาง democratizing รวมถึงในประเทศอาร์เจนตินาที่ทหารรัฐบาลตัดสินใจระงับการเลือกตั้งในปี 1946 Peron ได้รับเลือกเป็นประธาน โดยขอบหล่อในการเลือกตั้งที่แข่งขันเสรี และเป็นธรรมมาก เขามาถึงตำแหน่งระดับสูงทางการเมืองแห่งชาติกลับลงไป 1943 เมื่อเขาเป็นหนึ่งในผู้นำรัฐประหารที่สิ้นสุดระบอบ 1932-43 เขาทำหน้าที่เป็นแรงงานของเลขาธิการ และรองประธาน และเลขานุการของสงคราม เขาปลอมเป็นพันธมิตรถาวร มีการเคลื่อนย้ายแรงงาน สร้างโปรแกรมสวัสดิการมากมาย และขยายสิทธิทางสังคม ในเวลาเดียวกัน เรื่องความก้าวหน้ารื้อถอนสถาบันอิสระและเสรีภาพเพื่อสร้างระบอบประเทศเป็นโครงการประชานิยมArturo Frondizi, 1958-62รัฐประหาร 1955 ลบ peron เริ่มระยะยาวของความไม่แน่นอนทางการเมืองอาร์เจนตินาซึ่งกินเวลาจนถึงปี 1983 กับประธานาธิบดีทส่วนในยี่สิบแปดปี ระบอบที่แข่งขันและโปเหมือนถูกกัดเซาะอย่างรวดเร็วและแบ่ง After three years of military rule(1955-58), Argentina returned to competitive politics in 1958 when the military government withdrew from power and sponsored elections. Even though the elections represented a fair contest for the candidates allowed to participate, they were marredin terms of democratic principles by the proscription of the Peronists. The duros within the armed forces and their civilian allies including aprominent part of the UCR preferred the radical suppression of Peronists. Moreover, the virulent anti-Peronism of President Pedro Aramburu contributed to Peronist radicalization. If they had been allowed to run, Peronists would have won the elections an outcome that was unacceptable to the actors of the coalition that overthrew Peron in 1955. Because of the proscription of the largest party, the competitive regime established in 1958 was born with a congenial defect. The conservative’s fear of Peronism was a huge contributing factor to what O’Donnell called “the impossible game”: no government, whether authoritarian or semi-democratic, could create a stable governing coalition from 1955 to 1973. Arturo Illia, 1963-66Shortly after the March 1962 coup, deep divisions within the military came to the surface. The factions that favored a quick return to competitive politics won out, leading to new general elections in July 1963. The proscription of the Peronists meant that the new semi-democratic regime had the same congenital defect as the regime of 1958-62. This time Peron ordered his followers to cast a blank vote, and Arturo Illia of the URCP won the presidential election with a meager 25 percent of the popular vote. He assumed office in October 1963. Illia had a democratic temperament, and he governed with a democratic spirit even when he faced disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions. Against the hopes of conservatives, business interests, and the military, he refused to use repression even in the face of workers’ factory takeovers in May 1964. The government avoided radical policies and had a decidedly moderate agenda. According to Viola (1982:87), the freedom of expression and organization during this was unprecedented since 1946. The government even lifted electoral proscriptions against Peronist candidates in 1965. But much as occurred with Frondizi, the actors with a steadfast normative preference for democracy were few and far between – Ilia and his party were the sole exception. And once again, a pro-coup coalition gathered momentum quickly. Finally, on June 28, 1966, a military coup deposed President Illia.
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