she had knowledge of their peeking from a knowledgeable informant who was present during their
transgression (i.e., the eyewitness). Conversely, in the Bluffing condition, the experimenter told children
that she had knowledge of their peeking behavior from an ignorant informant who was absent
during the transgression (their teacher in a classroom several floors far away from the testing room).
Evidence to date suggests that children as young as 18 months understand that adults who are absent
from a room cannot know the behavior of those in the room, and adults not only need to be present
but also must have visual access to have knowledge about an event in the room (O’Neill, 1996). This
understanding is held by most children beyond 2 years of age. Consequently, children in the current
study should understand that their teacher, several floors away, is ignorant of their behavior and that
the experimenter could not gain genuine knowledge of their peeking from their teacher (Bluffing condition).
Thus, if children are strategic in their decision to lie, they should be more likely to choose to lie
in the Bluffing condition (because lying would not contradict the experimenter’s current knowledge)
than in the Informant condition (because lying would contradict the experimenter’s knowledge). In
the Informant condition, children should be more inclined to choose to confess about their transgression.
In contrast, if young children simply tell lies indiscriminately, their decision about whether to lie
should not be different in the two conditions.