Within the realist literature, the key medium of balancing is the forging of alliances, usually with the weaker or less threatening power. In Southeast Asia, two states—the Philippines and Thailand—are formal allies of the United States, but neither plays host to U.S. bases. Instead, they and a number of nonallied countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—provide
military facilities and access to U.S. naval and air forces. They also participate in bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, and some countries have preferential
military supply relations with the United States. These policies are aimed at facilitating the continued U.S. military presence and power projection capabilities in the region. Rather than encouraging the United States to target its
forces directly against China, though, the goal is to further buttress U.S. military superiority in the region, or to demonstrate the ability to harness it, to act as a general deterrent to Chinese (or other) aggression. These balancing policies are indirect, because they “borrow” U.S. military power, are not explicitly targeted against specific Chinese military threats, and are often undertaken in the name of other types of security interests shared with the United States