If I had undertaken solely to set out certain courses of action, I would
end this memorandum on the Third Estate here. . . . But I also intended to
examine certain principles. This involves pursuing the interests of the Third
Estate up to the moment when public discussion of the true composition of a
national assembly is likely to occur. In fixing the legislative constitution,
should the extraordinary representatives pay any attention to the odious and
impolitic distinction of orders? This is not a matter of issues or power but of
the laws determining the composition of the individual membership of
elected deputations. In addition to citizens, should any elected deputation
contain nobles and priests by virtue of any other entitlement than that of ordinary
citizenship? Should they above all be allowed to exercise separate, superior
rights on the basis of this entitlement? These are important questions
that should, at the least, be treated only after setting out true principle.
The first requirement is to have a clear idea of what the object or goal of
the representative assembly of a nation should be. That object cannot be
different from the one that the nation would have proposed to itself if it
were able to gather and confer in a single place.
What is a nation’s will? It is the product of individual wills, just as a nation
itself is the result of individuals assembling together. It is impossible
to conceive of a legitimate association whose objects are not common security,
common liberty, and a public establishment. Doubtless, every individual
also has individual goals and will say to himself, “I can go about
my own affairs and find happiness in my own way under the protection
of a common security, sure in the knowledge that the only legal limits to
my desires will be those prescribed to me by society for a common interest
in which I have a share and with which my own private interest has
made so useful an alliance.”
In the light of this, is it conceivable that any member of a general assembly
could be mad enough to say, “You are not here to deliberate
upon our common affairs, but to attend to mine in particular and those of
a little clique that I have formed with some among you?”
Simply to say that members of an association gather together to decide
how to deal with matters of common concern is all that needs to be said
about why they decided to join it. It is so self-evident a truth that any
further proof is tantamount to undermining it. The object of an assembly
is simply this: common affairs.
At this particular juncture, however, it may be worth thinking about
how all the members of a national assembly might be able to join their individual
wills together to form a common will that should be synonymous
with the public interest.
What is the Third Estate? 153
In the first instance, it is worth examining the mechanism or political
process in question in the most favorable circumstances, namely, one in
which the strength of public opinion makes it impossible for anyone in the
assembly to exhibit anything other than the common interest. Prodigies of
this kind have happened in different places, but none has lasted very long. It
would be a grave misjudgment of human nature to entrust the destiny of
societies to the endeavors of virtue. What is needed instead is for the nation’s
assembly to be constituted in such a way as to ensure that individual
interests remain isolated and the will of the majority cleaves consistently to
the public good even during those long periods when public manners are
in a state of decadence and egoism seems to be the universal rule. This can
be assured if the constitution is generally supported.
There are three types of interest to be found in the human heart: (1)
The one by which citizens resemble one another—this is the measure of
the common interest. (2) The one by which an individual allies himself
with no more than a number of others—this amounts to factional interest.
(3) The one by which each individual separates himself from the rest,
thinking solely of himself—this is self-interest.
The interest that makes one man join together in concord with all his
coassociates is, obviously, the object of the common will and the aim of
the common association.
But each voter will also bring his other two interests to every assembly.
This is unavoidable. Self-interest, however, is not to be feared. It is
isolated. Everyone has his own. Its very variety is its own solution.
The real problem thus arises from that interest by which one citizen
combines with no more than a small number of others. It is this interest
that makes for combinations and leagues. It is the source of projects that
are a danger to the community. It is the cradle of the most redoubtable
public enemies. History is full of evidence of this sad truth.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the social order should require
such rigor in preventing private citizens from becoming members
of corporate bodies and that it