In this work, Kurt Holukoff examines three formal approaches to representing
valid inferences in reasoning regarding obligation and its cognates: deontic logic. He
argues that an appropriate formalization of deontic logic should take genuine moral
dilemmas seriously, be capable of representing trumping-like reasoning, and not make
the naturalistic fallacy valid as a matter of logic. The three systems he investigates are,
the Standard Deontic logic, a Relevant Deontic logic, and Schotch and Jennings’ multiple
moral accessibility relations Deontic logic. The Standard Deontic logic has seemingly
insurmountable problems representing both fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of
obligations and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, the naturalistic fallacy is valid in the
Standard Deontic logic. The Relevant deontic logic that the author examines is capable of
representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and does not make
valid the naturalistic fallacy. However, the author argues that the Relevant deontic logic
needs some revisions in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Likewise, the author
finds that Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic is capable of representing fruitful
reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations. However, in order to represent
trumping-like reasoning, revisions to Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic are apparently
required. Similar revisions are seemingly required to block the naturalistic fallacy, which
is otherwise valid in Schotch and Jennings’ original system.
In this work, Kurt Holukoff examines three formal approaches to representing
valid inferences in reasoning regarding obligation and its cognates: deontic logic. He
argues that an appropriate formalization of deontic logic should take genuine moral
dilemmas seriously, be capable of representing trumping-like reasoning, and not make
the naturalistic fallacy valid as a matter of logic. The three systems he investigates are,
the Standard Deontic logic, a Relevant Deontic logic, and Schotch and Jennings’ multiple
moral accessibility relations Deontic logic. The Standard Deontic logic has seemingly
insurmountable problems representing both fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of
obligations and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, the naturalistic fallacy is valid in the
Standard Deontic logic. The Relevant deontic logic that the author examines is capable of
representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and does not make
valid the naturalistic fallacy. However, the author argues that the Relevant deontic logic
needs some revisions in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Likewise, the author
finds that Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic is capable of representing fruitful
reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations. However, in order to represent
trumping-like reasoning, revisions to Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic are apparently
required. Similar revisions are seemingly required to block the naturalistic fallacy, which
is otherwise valid in Schotch and Jennings’ original system.
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