The adoption problem is really a congeries of bargaining problems.
A quick but incomplete enumeration should suffice to indicate the obstacles
to adoption of either consociational or centripetal institutions.
First, there are asymmetric preferences. Majorities want majority
rule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently,
minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not. So a consociational
regime can be adopted only when majorities (or large pluralities)
are momentarily weak, often after periods of extended violence. At a
later stage, when majorities regain their strength, they may overthrow
it, as Greek Cypriots did in 1963 and as the Hutu in Burundi might be
inclined to do now.
The adoption problem is really a congeries of bargaining problems.A quick but incomplete enumeration should suffice to indicate the obstaclesto adoption of either consociational or centripetal institutions.First, there are asymmetric preferences. Majorities want majorityrule; minorities want guarantees against majority rule. Consequently,minorities may prefer consociation; majorities do not. So a consociationalregime can be adopted only when majorities (or large pluralities)are momentarily weak, often after periods of extended violence. At alater stage, when majorities regain their strength, they may overthrowit, as Greek Cypriots did in 1963 and as the Hutu in Burundi might beinclined to do now.
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