The distinction between liquidity and solvency crises is diffi cult to establish and not particularly operational
in the case of countries and their governments, in particular, taking into account the fact that insolvent
banks often have the implicit or explicit guaranty of their governments, which can lead to liquidity
problems for governments that may turn into solvency problems. Th e challenge is that it is diffi cult to
make this judgment ex ante or in the smog of crisis. In addition, a liquidity crisis, if mishandled, can
become a solvency crisis, which is the central message of the literature on multiple equilibria.51
Absent suffi cient temporary liquidity support, the risk is that when a country struggles through
raising taxes, cutting spending, and raising interest rates to meet its immediate external and fi scal
commitments, it will weaken the growth rate of its economy and the denominator of its sovereign debt
ratio. Nevertheless, for governments, the issue is primarily one of a political willingness to pay, not an
ability to pay. But the willingness of the body politic to support policies to continue to pay its debts and
the government’s debts evaporates. Th e deteriorating domestic support has adverse consequences not only
for the country and its citizens, but also for its neighbors and the global economy. Striking this diffi cult
balance is one of the rationales for low-cost external fi nancial support from institutions such as the IMF.
Th e IMF provides a blend of fi nancing and adjustment. Th e former meets short-term liquidity needs and
helps to stave off insolvency, or more precisely, default, in return for changes in policies that increase the
capacity of the country to repay not only the IMF and other sources of fi nancial support but also other
creditors. In other words, conditionality is essential, but all whip and little wampum invites failure.
Viewed through this lens, the Asian fi nancial crises were primarily liquidity crises and the European
fi nancial crises involve solvency to a greater degree.52 It was not entirely clear in 1997, but in retrospect,
two aspects of the Asian countries’ crises support this judgment.
First, the stock and fl ow fi scal positions of the governments were suffi ciently strong that they could
absorb the fi scal eff ects of recession. Th e governments could take onto their balance sheets some of the
51. See the application of this analysis to the European crises by Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji (2012).
52. I am indebted to Jeff rey Shafer for a conversation in which he shared this perspective.26
losses of fi nancial and, indirectly at least, nonfi nancial institutions without calling into question the
governments’ willingness to repay the resulting increase in debt as a percent of GDP.
The distinction between liquidity and solvency crises is diffi cult to establish and not particularly operational
in the case of countries and their governments, in particular, taking into account the fact that insolvent
banks often have the implicit or explicit guaranty of their governments, which can lead to liquidity
problems for governments that may turn into solvency problems. Th e challenge is that it is diffi cult to
make this judgment ex ante or in the smog of crisis. In addition, a liquidity crisis, if mishandled, can
become a solvency crisis, which is the central message of the literature on multiple equilibria.51
Absent suffi cient temporary liquidity support, the risk is that when a country struggles through
raising taxes, cutting spending, and raising interest rates to meet its immediate external and fi scal
commitments, it will weaken the growth rate of its economy and the denominator of its sovereign debt
ratio. Nevertheless, for governments, the issue is primarily one of a political willingness to pay, not an
ability to pay. But the willingness of the body politic to support policies to continue to pay its debts and
the government’s debts evaporates. Th e deteriorating domestic support has adverse consequences not only
for the country and its citizens, but also for its neighbors and the global economy. Striking this diffi cult
balance is one of the rationales for low-cost external fi nancial support from institutions such as the IMF.
Th e IMF provides a blend of fi nancing and adjustment. Th e former meets short-term liquidity needs and
helps to stave off insolvency, or more precisely, default, in return for changes in policies that increase the
capacity of the country to repay not only the IMF and other sources of fi nancial support but also other
creditors. In other words, conditionality is essential, but all whip and little wampum invites failure.
Viewed through this lens, the Asian fi nancial crises were primarily liquidity crises and the European
fi nancial crises involve solvency to a greater degree.52 It was not entirely clear in 1997, but in retrospect,
two aspects of the Asian countries’ crises support this judgment.
First, the stock and fl ow fi scal positions of the governments were suffi ciently strong that they could
absorb the fi scal eff ects of recession. Th e governments could take onto their balance sheets some of the
51. See the application of this analysis to the European crises by Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji (2012).
52. I am indebted to Jeff rey Shafer for a conversation in which he shared this perspective.26
losses of fi nancial and, indirectly at least, nonfi nancial institutions without calling into question the
governments’ willingness to repay the resulting increase in debt as a percent of GDP.
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