4.6.6 Behaviour of Regulators and the Division of “Narrow Banking” from
Investment Banking
In the light of the financial crisis, regulators internationally are re-examining the need for the
division of the different functions of banking – deposit taking, loan extension and payment
services provision – from the more complex and risky investment banking activities or whether
they can be undertaken by the same firms. The actual trend has clearly been for these functions
to be combined to a greater extent than ever before – as Bear Stearns has folded into JP
Morgan, Merrill Lynch into Bank of America, and part of Lehman’s into Barclays. In addition,
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have become bank holding companies with access to the
federal discount window (both are covered by the implicit assumption that the US government
would consider them too important to fail). Regardless of this trend, several commentators
have argued that regulation should be designed to produce a separation of “narrow banking”
from risky investment bank trading activities, a reimposition of the Glass-Steagall separation
of commercial and investment banking. Following the Great Crash of 1929, the US Congress
passed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act which, among other measures, prohibited a bank holding
company (a retail bank) from owning other financial institutions – such as investment banks
(House of Commons 2009). This provision was repealed in 1999. However, while there is
support for divorcing the “utility” functions from the “riskier” investment banking practices,
the world of banking has changed and it may no longer be possible to define those activities
which can be simply classified as investment banking. Nevertheless there is a rationale for
carefully considering how to insulate the vital functions of retail banking from adverse impacts
arising from the potential irrationality of liquid traded markets.
4.6.6 Behaviour of Regulators and the Division of “Narrow Banking” fromInvestment BankingIn the light of the financial crisis, regulators internationally are re-examining the need for thedivision of the different functions of banking – deposit taking, loan extension and paymentservices provision – from the more complex and risky investment banking activities or whetherthey can be undertaken by the same firms. The actual trend has clearly been for these functionsto be combined to a greater extent than ever before – as Bear Stearns has folded into JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch into Bank of America, and part of Lehman’s into Barclays. In addition,Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs have become bank holding companies with access to thefederal discount window (both are covered by the implicit assumption that the US governmentwould consider them too important to fail). Regardless of this trend, several commentatorshave argued that regulation should be designed to produce a separation of “narrow banking”from risky investment bank trading activities, a reimposition of the Glass-Steagall separationof commercial and investment banking. Following the Great Crash of 1929, the US Congresspassed the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act which, among other measures, prohibited a bank holdingcompany (a retail bank) from owning other financial institutions – such as investment banks(House of Commons 2009). This provision was repealed in 1999. However, while there issupport for divorcing the “utility” functions from the “riskier” investment banking practices,the world of banking has changed and it may no longer be possible to define those activitieswhich can be simply classified as investment banking. Nevertheless there is a rationale forcarefully considering how to insulate the vital functions of retail banking from adverse impactsarising from the potential irrationality of liquid traded markets.
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