Less radical observers view the IMF as neither prodevelopment nor antidevelopment
but simply as an institution trying to carry out its original, if
somewhat outdated, mandate to hold the global capitalist market together
through the pursuit of orthodox short-term international financial policies. Its
primary goal is the maintenance of an “orderly” international exchange system
designed to promote monetary cooperation, expand international trade,
control inflation, encourage exchange-rate stability, and help countries deal
with short-run balance of payments problems through the provision of scarce
foreign-exchange resources. Unfortunately, in a highly unequal trading world,
the balance of payments problems of many developing nations may be
structural and long-term in nature, with the result that short-term stabilization
policies may easily lead to long-run development crises.11 For example,
between 1982 and 1988, the IMF strategy was tested in 28 of the 32 nations of
Latin America and the Caribbean. It was clearly not working. During that
period, Latin America financed $145 billion in debt payments but at a cost of
economic stagnation, rising unemployment, and a decline in per capita income
of 7%.12 These countries “adjusted” but did not grow. By 1988, only two were
barely able to make their payments. The same situation prevailed in much of
Africa.