I have a strong interest in ancient philosophy, especially ancient ethics and moral psychology. As an undergraduate, my projects included papers on the Aristotelian division of the soul in Nicomachean Ethics and Plato’s account of justice in the Republic, both of which I presented at conferences in the United States and Canada. The capstone to my undergraduate studies was my honors thesis on Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy. In the thesis, a part of which has been published, I defend Boethius’ account of happiness against John Marenbon’s charges of inconsistency, and in contrast to other scholars like Joel Relihan and Marenbon, I argue that the text is best assessed as a piece of serious (non-ironic) philosophy rather than as an example of Menippean satire. My writing sample investigates a tension in Plato’s Gorgias between Socrates’ apparent intellectualist commitments and his defense of temperance. My central claim is that the tensions in the dialogue do not indicate that Socrates was conflicted about his intellectualism (contra Terence Irwin), nor does Plato use Gorgias to question intellectualism through Callicles (contra John Cooper). I defend a reading of the relationship between desire and reason which shows that Socrates’ intellectualism is consistent with his defense of temperance, and I argue that Callicles is a “reverse intellectualist” whose position does not foreshadow developments in Plato’s moral psychology. In my conclusion, I suggest two alternative strategies for understanding Gorgias’ place in Plato’s canon.