The dangers of the moral imperialism implied by radical universalism need hardly be emphasized. Radical universalism is subject to other moral objections as well. Moral rules, including human rights, function within a moral community. Radical universalism requires a rigid hierarchical ordering of the multiple moral communities to which individuals and groups belong. In order to preserve complete universality for human rights, the radical universalist must give absolute priority to the demands of the cosmopolitan moral community over all other (“lower”) moral communities.
This complete denial of national and subnational ethical autonomy and self-determination is not acceptable. Even if the nation should prove to be a doomed, transitory stage in the development of a human moral community, there is no inescapable logical or moral reason why peoples cannot accept or choose it as their principal form of social organization and the locus of important extrafamilial moral and political commitments. Similar arguments might be made for other communities that do not encompass the entire human race.
Once we allow the moral validity of such commitments, we are bound to accept at least certain types of substantive moral variability, including variability in human rights practices. Such moral “nationalism” may be based on political reasons, such as an inability to agree on the structure of a supranational organization or a fear of creating an instrument of universal tyranny. More directly moral reasons might also be advanced—for example, the advantage of international diversity provided by a strong commitment to national or local customs. Most important, it rests on the notion of self-determination. But however it is justified, at least certain choices of such moral communities demand respect from outsiders—not necessarily uncritical acceptance, let alone emulation, but, in some cases at least, tolerance.