More prosaically, Foucault's point is that the subject presupposed by liberal and radical pictures of power is a subject of power, a subject characterized by various capacities, but that liberal and radical analyses give us no account of the formation of the subject as a subject of power. His contention is that the analysis of power needs to account for this formation and, more controversially, that it can do so in terms of power relations. The latter claim has caused a major misunderstanding of Foucault's position,a misunderstanding encouraged by some of Foucault's own early formulation. However, the basic point being made is straightforward : (a) we acquire and exercise capacities through practice in the dual sense of practicing and practices as norm-governed activities and (b) our acquisition and exercise of capacities is structured by the ways in which our conduct is governed. So for example, the child playing a simple piece of music on the piano is practicing playing the piano and engaging in the norm-governed practice of piano playing and, hence,acquiring and exercising the capacity (to some extent or other ) to play the piano, where this involves the ability to engage a series of relatively precise bodily movement in a way that is normatively structure both by formal norms, expressed through the musical notation of the piece, and informal norms, relating to expressiveness, musicality,etc. The child may be playing the piano because he or she will be punished by his or her parents for not doing so, or because the child's self-perception is structured by social norms concerning the attributes expected of a young woman or man,or because the child is committed to a musical career,or simply because the child enjoys it. In the first two instances,the child's conduct is subject to government by others;in the latter two the child is exercising 'power over' him or herself. In all these cases,the power exercised over the child's conduct is productive, in the sense of developing his or her capacity for playing the piano. Notice, though,these four 'regimes' of power stand in rather different relations to the child's autonomy. The first two do not develop (but substitute for and, hence, may diminish) the child's power to engage in the self-directed exercise of his or her power ; the latter two, by contrast, are engagements not only in the practice of piano playing but also in the practice of the child directing their own activity by choosing to devote his or her time to practicing the piano rather than,say, watching television.