comprehensive financial conditionof LGFPs, including their cross-guarantees and subsidiaries, may not even be available totheir owners. This lack of transparency prevents banks and rating agencies from pricingcredit risk properly and prevents local governments from managing related risks prudently.
C. Sovereign Risk
23. In the worst case scenario, LGFPs may create potential contagion between the financial sector and the sovereign due to the close linkages between the public sector and banks. The losses in LGFPs could trigger a central government bailout of either localgovernments or banks. An abrupt increase in government debt and a worsening of theBankgovernment’s creditworthiness could generate a loss of confidence in banks given theimplicit government support for major banks in China. Though the central governmentcurrently has sufficient resources to bail out LGFPs, it may face tough resource constraints toaddress future financial risks if there is another similar expansion. In addition, it hassubstantial contingent liabilities . This cycle of credit expansion, credit losses, andgovernment bailout would intensify the moral hazard problem and eventually increaseChina’s sovereign risk.
24. In the medium term, the vanishing role of LGFPs, underpinned by the authorities’ continued monitoring and curbing of their development, along with the declining land sales revenue, may trigger more sovereign risk. An internationalcomparison shows that the deficits to GDP ratios in some provinces were even higher thanthe deficits to GDP ratio in several high fiscal deficit countries. In the past, thesefiscal financing gaps in local governments have been largely covered by the financing from
LGFP loans and the land sales revenue. For instance, during 1998 and 2011, the accumulated gaps between local fiscal revenues and expenditures amounted to RMB 18 trillion. Correspondingly, the land sales revenue rose from RMB16 billion in 1998 to RMB 3.2 trillion in 2011, with the accumulated annual land sales revenue during 1998 and 2011 amounting to RMB 13 trillion (see detailed discussion in section V.C). By adding the LGFPs loans of around RMB 4.97 trillion, the total revenue roughly covered the gaps between the local fiscal revenue and expenditure.
25. From a broad perspective, rapid credit expansion to LGFPs further distorts China’s economic structure. The procyclical behavior of LGFPs, along with the rapid creditexpansion, could result in excessive leverage and risk taking in the upswing, and, as aconsequence, excessive deleveraging in the downswing, thereby creating excessive volatilitywith dire consequences for financial stability and the real economy. Credit expansion toLGFPs could crowd out lending to the private sector, lead to the misallocation of capital,increase the reliance of the economy on investment, and exacerbate economic imbalances.Although credit expansion has stabilized growth in the short term, the economic
sustainability may be jeopardized.
comprehensive financial conditionof LGFPs, including their cross-guarantees and subsidiaries, may not even be available totheir owners. This lack of transparency prevents banks and rating agencies from pricingcredit risk properly and prevents local governments from managing related risks prudently.C. Sovereign Risk23. In the worst case scenario, LGFPs may create potential contagion between the financial sector and the sovereign due to the close linkages between the public sector and banks. The losses in LGFPs could trigger a central government bailout of either localgovernments or banks. An abrupt increase in government debt and a worsening of theBankgovernment’s creditworthiness could generate a loss of confidence in banks given theimplicit government support for major banks in China. Though the central governmentcurrently has sufficient resources to bail out LGFPs, it may face tough resource constraints toaddress future financial risks if there is another similar expansion. In addition, it hassubstantial contingent liabilities . This cycle of credit expansion, credit losses, andgovernment bailout would intensify the moral hazard problem and eventually increaseChina’s sovereign risk.24. In the medium term, the vanishing role of LGFPs, underpinned by the authorities’ continued monitoring and curbing of their development, along with the declining land sales revenue, may trigger more sovereign risk. An internationalcomparison shows that the deficits to GDP ratios in some provinces were even higher thanthe deficits to GDP ratio in several high fiscal deficit countries. In the past, thesefiscal financing gaps in local governments have been largely covered by the financing fromLGFP loans and the land sales revenue. For instance, during 1998 and 2011, the accumulated gaps between local fiscal revenues and expenditures amounted to RMB 18 trillion. Correspondingly, the land sales revenue rose from RMB16 billion in 1998 to RMB 3.2 trillion in 2011, with the accumulated annual land sales revenue during 1998 and 2011 amounting to RMB 13 trillion (see detailed discussion in section V.C). By adding the LGFPs loans of around RMB 4.97 trillion, the total revenue roughly covered the gaps between the local fiscal revenue and expenditure.25. From a broad perspective, rapid credit expansion to LGFPs further distorts China’s economic structure. The procyclical behavior of LGFPs, along with the rapid creditexpansion, could result in excessive leverage and risk taking in the upswing, and, as aconsequence, excessive deleveraging in the downswing, thereby creating excessive volatilitywith dire consequences for financial stability and the real economy. Credit expansion toLGFPs could crowd out lending to the private sector, lead to the misallocation of capital,increase the reliance of the economy on investment, and exacerbate economic imbalances.Although credit expansion has stabilized growth in the short term, the economicsustainability may be jeopardized.
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