Table 10: State and Region Budget Units and Constitutional Assignments
Departments Appearing in State and Region Budget Schedule I (Union) Schedule II
(State/Region) Residual/ Uncertain
General Administration Department
Special Investigation Department
Prison Department
Settlements and Land records Department
Department of Agriculture
Department of Industrial Crops Development
Cooperative Office
Department of Small Scale Industries
Fisheries Department
Department of Livestock and Veterinary
Department of Beekeeping
Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development
Maintenance of Buildings, Roads, and Bridges
Public Construction
Budget Department
Department of Planning
Central Stevedoring Committee
Forestry Department
Dry Zone Green Project Development
Department of Sports and Physical Education
Water Transport Development
Municipals
Myanmar Film Making
Myanmar Salt and Marine Chemical Enterprise
Myanmar Pharmaceutical and Foodstuff Industry
Home Utilities Industry
Source: Nixon et al 2013.
Revenue assignments are set out in Schedule V of the Constitution. There are 19 tax headings under the schedule but currently the region and state governments are allowed to collect under nine headings, while the budget headings indicate only seven sources of tax revenues: excise tax, land tax, embankment tax, forestry tax, mining tax, lakes/streams tax, and municipal tax. The total amount of taxes collected from these sources by region and state governments is currently about 4% of total government revenues, with variations from 13% in Mandalay Region to 0.7% to Rakhine State, a reflection in part of the differing levels of economic development across states and regions.17 For almost all states and regions, the municipal tax is either the first or the second most important revenue source. International experience suggests that local governments should be assigned stable sources of revenue that are easy to administer and clearly separable across different local jurisdictions; and commonly agreed examples of such sources include: real estate property taxes, retail sales taxes, business fees, motor vehicle fees, and user charges. From this perspective, the current list of local taxes for Myanmar would seem to be a good beginning, but will need to be reviewed in the context of the overall reform of the government’s tax policy as well as the future directions for decentralization. Of
17 Extracted from 2012–2013 State and Region Budgets, as reported in the official Gazette.
particular importance will be the outcome of the peace negotiations and any agreements reached in that context on sharing of natural resource wealth.
Since the assignment of revenue sources rarely provides local governments with sufficient revenues to fund their expenditure functions, intergovernmental transfers are often necessary. This is the case in Myanmar, where there are currently two types of unconditional/conditional transfer: grants for poverty reduction, under which one billion kyat was distributed in FY2012 evenly to all regions and states (except for Chin State, which receives three times more than other regions and states because of its high poverty rate and difficult transportation situation); and other grants primarily for the purpose of helping regions and states “balance their books” (Figure 4). In total, these two types of transfers are very small and are far outweighed by the funding provided directly by union ministries. The system of intergovernmental transfers does, however, require a major review, (the World Bank (2013) has noted that it is “neither rules-based nor transparent”) and in this regard, Myanmar can draw on a wealth of international experience of use for such transfers, including “vertical” or “horizontal” balance, funding specific national priorities, counteracting effects of interregional spillovers or externalities, etc., the form in which such transfers are made (conditional or unconditional), and some universally accepted principles of transfer design (Box 8). The development of the transfer system in Myanmar will also be crucially dependent on broader decisions taken with respect to decentralization, including how much subnational spending will be achieved through deconcentration versus devolution to regions and states, and how natural resource wealth is to be shared.
Figure 4: Types of Central Government Transfers
Union (Central) Government
Unconditional/ Conditional Grants
Unconditional/ (Sectoral) Conditional
Grants
Own Source
Revenue
Poverty
Reduction Fund
Grants to Region and States
Education, Health, etc.
Schedule I GAD
Schedule I/II Depts.
GAD = General Administration Department. Source: Authors.
The fourth and final pillar of decentralization is subnational borrowing. At present, the debt recorded as being incurred by regions and states appears to relate to union support for the operating deficits of SEEs, and in general, regional and state governments are reluctant to borrow because of an inability to repay. To avoid any possibility that imbalances at the regional and state levels could impact on macroeconomic stability, it will be important to put in place a well-defined framework for any local borrowing that may be permitted.
Box 8: Principles of Transfer Design
Providing revenue adequacy. A transfer formula should, as far as possible, provide a source of adequate resources for local governments.
Preserving budget autonomy. A transfer system should preserve budget autonomy at the subnational level within the constraints provided by national priorities.
Enhancing equity and fairness. The transfer mechanism should support a fair allocation of resources. Stability. Transfers should be provided in a predictable manner over time.
Simplicity and transparency. Transfer formulas should be simple and transparent, and should pursue one objective at a time.
Incentive compatibility. The transfer system should not create negative incentives for local revenue mobilization, and should not induce inefficient expenditure choices.
Focus on service delivery. Transfer formulas should focus on the demand (clients or outputs) rather than the supply
(inputs and infrastructure) of local government services.
Avoid equal shares. Reliance on the “equal shares” principle (whereby all local governments at the same level, whatever their size and characteristics, receive the same size of transfer) as a major allocation factor should be avoided in the design of an allocation formula.
Avoid sudden large changes. The transfer system should avoid sudden large changes in funding for local governments—
especially during the introduction of a new transfer mechanism.
Grants should be announced in a timely manner corresponding to the local budget cycle.
Source: UNDP 2005.
The government will also need to review both the system and the capacity for preparing, approving and implementing the budget. Since FY2012, region and state governments have been accountable for preparing their own budget proposals with a participatory budgeting approach. Departmental expenditures were estimated based on previous years’ expenditures and budget proposals, and estimated expenditures sent to the Finance and Revenue Department and the Planning and Economic Development Department for review. The Budget Department has scrutinized the budget and consolidated the current, capital and financial budget with the regions and states budget allocation; and the Planning and Economic Development Department has made sure the budget was in line with proposed local development projects. The budgets have then been submitted to the MoFR and MNPED for review, after which, the Financial Commission has vetted the budgets of both the Union and regions and states before submitting the bill to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, where the final decisions on the amount of budget to be allocated for each region and state have been made (Ministry of Information 2008). It will also be necessary to consider what guidelines should be introduced at the different levels of the system to help with budget preparation, approval, and implementation and how best to strengthen the capacity at different levels to effectively use the guidelines and manage the system.
In sum, significant developments are taking place across all aspects of fiscal decentralization. Drawing on lessons of international experience (Box 9), it will now be important to carefully review experience with decentralization and its management.
Box 9: Fiscal Decentralization, Lessons of Country Experience
The sequencing of decentralization matters: resources should be made available to subnational governments pari passu with the assignment to them of spending responsibilities.
The pace of decentralization should be linked as much as possible to the capacity of subnational governments to effectively carry out the functions assigned to them.
While spending responsibilities in some sectors (such as education and health) will inevitably overlap across levels of government, it is important to ensure adequate clarity of the role of each level of government in the provision of the services, to avoid duplication, waste, and loss of accountability.
In some cases, complementary policy reforms are also needed, such as in the civil service and regulatory frameworks. Realizing the potential efficiency gains of decentralization in the provision of public goods and services often requires
significant investments in capacity building and improvement of PFM systems at the subnational level, in particular, aiming
at improving transparency of the budget process in all its phases.
In order to facilitate th
Table 10: State and Region Budget Units and Constitutional AssignmentsDepartments Appearing in State and Region Budget Schedule I (Union) Schedule II(State/Region) Residual/ UncertainGeneral Administration Department Special Investigation Department Prison Department Settlements and Land records Department Department of Agriculture Department of Industrial Crops Development Cooperative Office Department of Small Scale Industries Fisheries Department Department of Livestock and Veterinary Department of Beekeeping Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development Maintenance of Buildings, Roads, and Bridges Public Construction Budget Department Department of Planning Central Stevedoring Committee Forestry Department Dry Zone Green Project Development Department of Sports and Physical Education Water Transport Development Municipals Myanmar Film Making Myanmar Salt and Marine Chemical Enterprise Myanmar Pharmaceutical and Foodstuff Industry Home Utilities Industry Source: Nixon et al 2013.Revenue assignments are set out in Schedule V of the Constitution. There are 19 tax headings under the schedule but currently the region and state governments are allowed to collect under nine headings, while the budget headings indicate only seven sources of tax revenues: excise tax, land tax, embankment tax, forestry tax, mining tax, lakes/streams tax, and municipal tax. The total amount of taxes collected from these sources by region and state governments is currently about 4% of total government revenues, with variations from 13% in Mandalay Region to 0.7% to Rakhine State, a reflection in part of the differing levels of economic development across states and regions.17 For almost all states and regions, the municipal tax is either the first or the second most important revenue source. International experience suggests that local governments should be assigned stable sources of revenue that are easy to administer and clearly separable across different local jurisdictions; and commonly agreed examples of such sources include: real estate property taxes, retail sales taxes, business fees, motor vehicle fees, and user charges. From this perspective, the current list of local taxes for Myanmar would seem to be a good beginning, but will need to be reviewed in the context of the overall reform of the government’s tax policy as well as the future directions for decentralization. Of17 Extracted from 2012–2013 State and Region Budgets, as reported in the official Gazette. particular importance will be the outcome of the peace negotiations and any agreements reached in that context on sharing of natural resource wealth.Since the assignment of revenue sources rarely provides local governments with sufficient revenues to fund their expenditure functions, intergovernmental transfers are often necessary. This is the case in Myanmar, where there are currently two types of unconditional/conditional transfer: grants for poverty reduction, under which one billion kyat was distributed in FY2012 evenly to all regions and states (except for Chin State, which receives three times more than other regions and states because of its high poverty rate and difficult transportation situation); and other grants primarily for the purpose of helping regions and states “balance their books” (Figure 4). In total, these two types of transfers are very small and are far outweighed by the funding provided directly by union ministries. The system of intergovernmental transfers does, however, require a major review, (the World Bank (2013) has noted that it is “neither rules-based nor transparent”) and in this regard, Myanmar can draw on a wealth of international experience of use for such transfers, including “vertical” or “horizontal” balance, funding specific national priorities, counteracting effects of interregional spillovers or externalities, etc., the form in which such transfers are made (conditional or unconditional), and some universally accepted principles of transfer design (Box 8). The development of the transfer system in Myanmar will also be crucially dependent on broader decisions taken with respect to decentralization, including how much subnational spending will be achieved through deconcentration versus devolution to regions and states, and how natural resource wealth is to be shared.Figure 4: Types of Central Government TransfersUnion (Central) Government Unconditional/ Conditional Grants Unconditional/ (Sectoral) Conditional Grants Own SourceRevenue PovertyReduction Fund Grants to Region and States Education, Health, etc. Schedule I GAD Schedule I/II Depts. GAD = General Administration Department. Source: Authors.The fourth and final pillar of decentralization is subnational borrowing. At present, the debt recorded as being incurred by regions and states appears to relate to union support for the operating deficits of SEEs, and in general, regional and state governments are reluctant to borrow because of an inability to repay. To avoid any possibility that imbalances at the regional and state levels could impact on macroeconomic stability, it will be important to put in place a well-defined framework for any local borrowing that may be permitted. Box 8: Principles of Transfer DesignProviding revenue adequacy. A transfer formula should, as far as possible, provide a source of adequate resources for local governments.Preserving budget autonomy. A transfer system should preserve budget autonomy at the subnational level within the constraints provided by national priorities.Enhancing equity and fairness. The transfer mechanism should support a fair allocation of resources. Stability. Transfers should be provided in a predictable manner over time.Simplicity and transparency. Transfer formulas should be simple and transparent, and should pursue one objective at a time.
Incentive compatibility. The transfer system should not create negative incentives for local revenue mobilization, and should not induce inefficient expenditure choices.
Focus on service delivery. Transfer formulas should focus on the demand (clients or outputs) rather than the supply
(inputs and infrastructure) of local government services.
Avoid equal shares. Reliance on the “equal shares” principle (whereby all local governments at the same level, whatever their size and characteristics, receive the same size of transfer) as a major allocation factor should be avoided in the design of an allocation formula.
Avoid sudden large changes. The transfer system should avoid sudden large changes in funding for local governments—
especially during the introduction of a new transfer mechanism.
Grants should be announced in a timely manner corresponding to the local budget cycle.
Source: UNDP 2005.
The government will also need to review both the system and the capacity for preparing, approving and implementing the budget. Since FY2012, region and state governments have been accountable for preparing their own budget proposals with a participatory budgeting approach. Departmental expenditures were estimated based on previous years’ expenditures and budget proposals, and estimated expenditures sent to the Finance and Revenue Department and the Planning and Economic Development Department for review. The Budget Department has scrutinized the budget and consolidated the current, capital and financial budget with the regions and states budget allocation; and the Planning and Economic Development Department has made sure the budget was in line with proposed local development projects. The budgets have then been submitted to the MoFR and MNPED for review, after which, the Financial Commission has vetted the budgets of both the Union and regions and states before submitting the bill to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, where the final decisions on the amount of budget to be allocated for each region and state have been made (Ministry of Information 2008). It will also be necessary to consider what guidelines should be introduced at the different levels of the system to help with budget preparation, approval, and implementation and how best to strengthen the capacity at different levels to effectively use the guidelines and manage the system.
In sum, significant developments are taking place across all aspects of fiscal decentralization. Drawing on lessons of international experience (Box 9), it will now be important to carefully review experience with decentralization and its management.
Box 9: Fiscal Decentralization, Lessons of Country Experience
The sequencing of decentralization matters: resources should be made available to subnational governments pari passu with the assignment to them of spending responsibilities.
The pace of decentralization should be linked as much as possible to the capacity of subnational governments to effectively carry out the functions assigned to them.
While spending responsibilities in some sectors (such as education and health) will inevitably overlap across levels of government, it is important to ensure adequate clarity of the role of each level of government in the provision of the services, to avoid duplication, waste, and loss of accountability.
In some cases, complementary policy reforms are also needed, such as in the civil service and regulatory frameworks. Realizing the potential efficiency gains of decentralization in the provision of public goods and services often requires
significant investments in capacity building and improvement of PFM systems at the subnational level, in particular, aiming
at improving transparency of the budget process in all its phases.
In order to facilitate th
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