merely one of the virtues. In the individual, justice consists in fairness; but in relation to others, justice is lawfulness. The law may provide, at least in the case of overt actions which affect others, for the numerous contingencies consequent on dereliction of other virtues on the part of individuals. This dialectical ambivalence by which "justice" has different significances as related to the individual himself and to individuals associated
in groups is found also in the treatment of the intellectual virtues. Prudence, like justice, has two forms, since the same habit may be concerned with the action of an individual or it may be directed to the regulation of a state. Prudence is identical with political wisdom.33 Similarly, in the ascending line of the dialectic, potentialities are treated in terms of actualities and actualities in terms of potentialities, efficient causes determine ends
and calculation directed to ends insures rightness of means, until the argument culminates in the final cause or end of man, happiness, the activity which is according to what is best in
us and which guides us to what is noble and divine in things. The moral virtues determine the right mark at which to aim actions; prudence determines the means to it; and wisdom in
its possession and exercise determines happiness. Wisdom, the culmination of all other human activities, is discernible there , where the distinction between justice and virtue
is summed up: "They are the same, but their being is not the same: as relative to
others, it is justice; as a certain kind of habit without qualification, it is virtue. "
"Political science and prudence are the same habit, but their being is not the same. Of the science which is concerned with the city, that which is architectonic is the legislative prudence, that which deals with particulars has the common name political. Prudence also is commonly thought to be that which is concerned with oneself and the individual; and this bears the common name prudence, while the others are distinguished as household management, legislation, politics, and the latter is subdivided into deliberative and judicial." The manner in which these distinctions are made sets them apart from the lists of meanings of terms which are drawn up in physical and metaphysical inquiries, since in the theoretic sciences a difference of essence permits a differentiation of univocal terms, that is, terms which retain a single meaning, while in moral and political inquiries identical habits
may possess in different relations different modes of being manifested in different activities
and subject, therefore, to different branches of knowledge.