The falsification principle has been developed as an alternative theory by which it may be possible to distinguish between those religious statements that may potentially have meaning, and those that are meaningless. It proposes that most religious language is unfalsifiable because there is no way that it could be empirically proven false. In a landmark paper published in 1945, analytic philosopher Antony Flew argued that a meaningful statement must simultaneously assert and deny a state of affairs; for example, the statement "God loves us" both asserts that God loves us and denies that God does not love us. Flew maintained that if a religious believer could not say what circumstances would have to exist for their statements about God to be false, then they are unfalsifiable and meaningless.[50]
Using John Wisdom's parable of the invisible gardener, Flew attempted to demonstrate that religious language is unfalsifiable. The parable tells the story of two people who discover a garden on a deserted island; one believes it is tended to by a gardener, the other believes that it formed naturally, without the existence of a gardener. The two watch out for the gardener but never find him; the non-believer consequently maintains that there is no gardener, whereas the believer rationalises the non-appearance by suggesting that the gardener is invisible and cannot be detected.[54] Flew contended that if the believer's interpretation is accepted, nothing is left of the original gardener. He argued that religious believers tend to adopt counterpart rationalisations in response to any apparent challenge to their beliefs from empirical evidence; and these beliefs consequently suffer a "death by a thousand qualifications" as they are qualified and modified so much that they end up asserting nothing meaningful.[55] Flew applied his principles to religious claims such as God's love for humans, arguing that if they are meaningful assertions they would deny a certain state of affairs. He argued that when faced with evidence against the existence of a loving God, such as the terminal illness of a child, theists will qualify their claims to allow for such evidence; for example they may suggest that God's love is different from human love. Such qualifications, Flew argued, make the original proposition meaningless; he questioned what God's love actually promises and what it guarantees against, and proposed that God's qualified love promises nothing and becomes worthless.[56]
Flew continued in many subsequent publications to maintain the falsifiability criterion for meaning; but in later life retracted the specific assertion in his 1945 paper that all religious language is unfalsifiable, and so meaningless. Drawing specifically on the emerging science of molecular genetics (which had not existed at the time of his original paper), Flew eventually became convinced that the complexity this revealed in the mechanisms of biological reproduction might not be consistent with the time known to have been available for evolution on Earth to have happened; and that this potentially suggested a valid empirical test by which the assertion "that there is no creator God" might be falsified; "the latest work I have seen shows that the present physical universe gives too little time for these theories of abiogenesis to get the job done."[57]
It is a presupposition for applying the falsification principle to religious language that some assertions of religious belief or non-belief could potentially have been established purely from empirical evidence, even had none actually been so. When the sceptic challenges the believer to apply a falsification test to their assertions of belief, there is an underlying implication that were that test to be passed, the sceptic would be persuaded to assent to those particular assertions of the believer – even if the believer would not have abandoned his beliefs had the test been failed. In which case, the beliefs of the persuaded sceptic would be meaningful. Flew, in his last years, considered himself to be just such a persuaded sceptic, and hence accepted the term Deist as a valid descriptor for his religious standpoint. Flew nevertheless continued to maintain the non-falsifiability of religious assertions purportedly derived from divine revelation as presented by dogmatic believers, all of which he rejected as meaningless.
The falsification principle has been developed as an alternative theory by which it may be possible to distinguish between those religious statements that may potentially have meaning, and those that are meaningless. It proposes that most religious language is unfalsifiable because there is no way that it could be empirically proven false. In a landmark paper published in 1945, analytic philosopher Antony Flew argued that a meaningful statement must simultaneously assert and deny a state of affairs; for example, the statement "God loves us" both asserts that God loves us and denies that God does not love us. Flew maintained that if a religious believer could not say what circumstances would have to exist for their statements about God to be false, then they are unfalsifiable and meaningless.[50]Using John Wisdom's parable of the invisible gardener, Flew attempted to demonstrate that religious language is unfalsifiable. The parable tells the story of two people who discover a garden on a deserted island; one believes it is tended to by a gardener, the other believes that it formed naturally, without the existence of a gardener. The two watch out for the gardener but never find him; the non-believer consequently maintains that there is no gardener, whereas the believer rationalises the non-appearance by suggesting that the gardener is invisible and cannot be detected.[54] Flew contended that if the believer's interpretation is accepted, nothing is left of the original gardener. He argued that religious believers tend to adopt counterpart rationalisations in response to any apparent challenge to their beliefs from empirical evidence; and these beliefs consequently suffer a "death by a thousand qualifications" as they are qualified and modified so much that they end up asserting nothing meaningful.[55] Flew applied his principles to religious claims such as God's love for humans, arguing that if they are meaningful assertions they would deny a certain state of affairs. He argued that when faced with evidence against the existence of a loving God, such as the terminal illness of a child, theists will qualify their claims to allow for such evidence; for example they may suggest that God's love is different from human love. Such qualifications, Flew argued, make the original proposition meaningless; he questioned what God's love actually promises and what it guarantees against, and proposed that God's qualified love promises nothing and becomes worthless.[56]Flew continued in many subsequent publications to maintain the falsifiability criterion for meaning; but in later life retracted the specific assertion in his 1945 paper that all religious language is unfalsifiable, and so meaningless. Drawing specifically on the emerging science of molecular genetics (which had not existed at the time of his original paper), Flew eventually became convinced that the complexity this revealed in the mechanisms of biological reproduction might not be consistent with the time known to have been available for evolution on Earth to have happened; and that this potentially suggested a valid empirical test by which the assertion "that there is no creator God" might be falsified; "the latest work I have seen shows that the present physical universe gives too little time for these theories of abiogenesis to get the job done."[57]It is a presupposition for applying the falsification principle to religious language that some assertions of religious belief or non-belief could potentially have been established purely from empirical evidence, even had none actually been so. When the sceptic challenges the believer to apply a falsification test to their assertions of belief, there is an underlying implication that were that test to be passed, the sceptic would be persuaded to assent to those particular assertions of the believer – even if the believer would not have abandoned his beliefs had the test been failed. In which case, the beliefs of the persuaded sceptic would be meaningful. Flew, in his last years, considered himself to be just such a persuaded sceptic, and hence accepted the term Deist as a valid descriptor for his religious standpoint. Flew nevertheless continued to maintain the non-falsifiability of religious assertions purportedly derived from divine revelation as presented by dogmatic believers, all of which he rejected as meaningless.
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