Abstract The "Asian Crisis of 1997-98 affected all the "emerging markets open to capital flows Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent ofexchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that n countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices. o 2000 Elsevier Science SA All rights reserved. JEL classification: G18: G38: K22 Komondo: Corporate governance Investor protection: Financial crisis 'Helpful comments on earlier drafts were provided by Olivier Blanchard. Ricardo Caballero, Stijn Claessens Douglas Diamond. Stephanie Flanders, Mary Kwak, Rafael La Porta, Don Lessard, Richard Locke, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Stewart Myers Andrei Sheifer, Ed Sein eld. Soott Stern, Kenia Yudaeva. Luigi Zingales, three anonymous recrees, and seminar particpants at the NBER orporate finance workshop, the Stockholm School of Economics, and the Federal Reeve Bank of Florencio Lopez-de-Silancs kindly provided access to unpublishod data Konstantina DakouE and Matthew Utterback were very helpful reseirch assistants Gencrous support was provided by the MIT Entrepreneurship Centre for Economic Polisy (RECEP Center and the Russian-European 'Corresponding author. Tel: +1-617-253-8412: fax: 1-617-253-2660. Email adiesr: sjohnson@mit.edu S. Johnson) see front matter o 2000 Elsevier science sA. An rights reserved osx Pll:
Abstract The "Asian Crisis of 1997-98 affected all the "emerging markets open to capital flows Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent ofexchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that n countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices. o 2000 Elsevier Science SA All rights reserved. JEL classification: G18: G38: K22 Komondo: Corporate governance Investor protection: Financial crisis 'Helpful comments on earlier drafts were provided by Olivier Blanchard. Ricardo Caballero, Stijn Claessens Douglas Diamond. Stephanie Flanders, Mary Kwak, Rafael La Porta, Don Lessard, Richard Locke, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Stewart Myers Andrei Sheifer, Ed Sein eld. Soott Stern, Kenia Yudaeva. Luigi Zingales, three anonymous recrees, and seminar particpants at the NBER orporate finance workshop, the Stockholm School of Economics, and the Federal Reeve Bank of Florencio Lopez-de-Silancs kindly provided access to unpublishod data Konstantina DakouE and Matthew Utterback were very helpful reseirch assistants Gencrous support was provided by the MIT Entrepreneurship Centre for Economic Polisy (RECEP Center and the Russian-European 'Corresponding author. Tel: +1-617-253-8412: fax: 1-617-253-2660. Email adiesr: sjohnson@mit.edu S. Johnson) see front matter o 2000 Elsevier science sA. An rights reserved osx Pll:
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
