Two initiatives that ignored the due process resulted nonetheless in outcomes that did not violate the policy consensus(3): the Singapore offer to grant the US access to some military facilities, and the Australian-Indonesian security agreement. Singapore’s consultation with ASEAN partners was unsatisfactory, while Indonesia’s was non-existent. However, on ASEAN member had serious reservation about the policy outcome in either case. The idea of an ASEAN community is discredited more severely by the large number of instance when the decision-making process violated ASEAN norms and the envisaged policy of the initiative ignored vital interests of ASEAN partners, thus negating the principle of consensus.4 Firstly, the secret Thai-Chinese alliance of January 1979 was not only concluded in camera, but its strategic assumptions were also opposed to the views held by leaders in Indonesia and Malaysia at that time. Secondly, the 1980 Kuantan Declaration, a bilateral initiative, was in clear contradiction to ASEAN’s previous consensus. Even though it did not became official policy, the declaration harmed ASEAN as it gave the (accurate) impression of disunity. Thirdly, Chatichal’s announcement and implementation of his new Indochina policy was a blatant violation of ASEAN norms, in both process and substance. In two other, more recent, cases, unilateral initiatives ignored procedural norms and fundamental strategic concerns of ASEAN partner, although they were dependent on ASEAN endorsement: Mahathir’s EAEC proposal, and Chavalit’s NATO proposal. Consequently, the former was modified to insignificance and the latter excluded altogether from ASEAN’s agenda. Interestingly, one common feature of most initiatives in disregard of the “ASEAN way” was the non-involvement of the foreign ministries. Foreign ministries fulfill the role of being the repository of the “ASAEN way”, as their official are well-versed in ASEAN procedures.