Arguments about novelty
It may as well be said outright that there is no agreement in the general ethics literature on whether or not new technologies have introduced new ethical issues. Some authors argue that recent advances have introduced new issues; others argue that they have not.
Kuflik (1992) maintains that the issues most often identified in computer ethics are not in fact new, although they may be heightened by the effects of technology. Kuflik first sorts the issues into four areas of concern:
- (1) direct risks to users;
- (2) privacy;
- (3) reliability; and
- (4) responsibility.
He then considers each area, pointing out the ways in which those issues are fundamentally the same as previously known problems. For example, the potential effect of computing on the work conditions and skills of the user (which Kuflik refers to as the "dumbing down" effect) is shown to be fundamentally the same as other historical changes: the development of writing led to the loss of oral skills, the introduction of the telephone stunted the art of written correspondence, and so on.
Hauptman and Motin (1994) agree that new technology does not require new ethics; in fact, they claim that terms such as "cyberethics" and "virtual morality" are nonsense. Even though information technology may result in more complex systems, the basic ethical commitments remain the same, and traditional ethical considerations are shown to apply to issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other aspects of networked communication. Hauptman and Motin also point out that rudeness and inconsiderate behavior ("flaming," for example) should not be confused with ethical issues.
In contrast, Ladd (1991) argues that new information technologies do require new ethical concepts, or at least substantial restructuring of traditional concepts. In particular, he considers questions of responsibility. Denying the concept of technological neutrality and focusing on questions raised in shared human-computer tasks, he concludes that shifting responsibility from human to computer results in dangerous risks, and should be carefully evaluated.
Severson (1995) brings the issues a bit closer to home, arguing that library automation creates new circumstances "beyond the ken of our moral sensibilities," confusing new realms in which old habits of evaluation are inadequate. He argues that as professionals, with their increased freedom and responsibility, enter this new environment, they must reexamine traditional ethical principles for guidance.
However, neither Ladd nor Severson present compelling arguments to pinpoint just how new technologies have changed ethics in the information professions; as a result, their conclusions are too general to be convincing. If new ethical issues are to be identified, a closer examination of specific instances in the information professions is necessary.