unique" (Sharpley 1994:130). However, the extension of this museum-
linked usage to tourism simplifies the complex nature of authenticity in tourist experiences. First of all, the issue of authenticity in tourism
can be differentiated into two separate issues: that of tourist experiences (or authentic experiences) and that of toured objects. While these are two separate aspects of authenticity, they are often confused as one.
Handler and Saxton (1988:243) notice this distinction when they point out that "An authentic experience ... is one in which individuals feel themselves to be in touch both with a 'real' world and with their 'real'
selves" (1988:24-3). Selwyn (1996a) goes one step further to link the experience of a "real" world to "authenticity as knowledge"—namely, "cool" authenticity—and to relate the experience of a "real" self to
"authenticity as feeling"—namely, "hot" authenticity. However, it would be wrong to propose that the emotional experience of the "real" self ("hot authenticity") necessarily entails, coincides with, or results
from the. epistemological experience of a "real" world out there ("cool authenticity"), as if the latter is•the sole cause of the former (effect). As will be shown, this differentiation of "the authenticity of experi-
ences" from "the authenticity of toured objects" is crucial for intro-
ducineexisteritial authenticity" as an alternative source of authentic
experiences. Certain toured objects, such as nature, are in a strict . sense irrelevant to authenticity in MacCannell's sense. However, nat-
ure tourism is surely one of the major ways.of experiencing a "real" ;self. That is to say, what nature tourism involves is an existential
authenticity rather than the authenticity of objects.
Second, the complex nature of authenticity in tourism is exhibited in the fact that it can be further classified into objective, constructive,
• and existential authenticity (Table 1). Objective authenticity involves a museum-linked usage of the authenticity of the originals that are also the toured objects to be perceived by tourists. It follows that the
authentic experience is caused by the recognition of the toured objects as authentic. As such,- there is an absolute and objective criterion used to measure authenticity. Thus, even though the tourists themselves think they have gained authentic experiences, this can, however, still be judged as inauthentic, if the toured objects are "in fact" false, contrived, or what MacCannell (1973) calls "staged authenticity". By constructive authenticity it is.meant the result of social construction, not an objectively measurable quality of what is being visited. Things appear authentic not because they are inherently authentic but because they_ are constructed as such in terms of points of view, beliefs, perspectives, or powers. This notion is thus relative, negotiable
(Cohen 1988), contextually determined (Salamone -1997), and even ideological (Silver 1993). It can be the projection pf one's dreams, stereotyped images, and expectations onto toured objects (Bruner
1991; Silver 1993). In this sense, what the tourist quests for is symbolic 'authenticity (Culler 1981). Here a big distinction arises; Unlike both objective and constructive (or symbolic) authenticities which involve whether and how the toured.objects arc authentic, existential experi-
ence involves personal or intersubjective. feelings activated by the liminal process of tourist activities.- In such a liminal experience, peOple feel they themselves are much more authentic and' more freely
unique" (Sharpley 1994:130). However, the extension of this museum-
linked usage to tourism simplifies the complex nature of authenticity in tourist experiences. First of all, the issue of authenticity in tourism
can be differentiated into two separate issues: that of tourist experiences (or authentic experiences) and that of toured objects. While these are two separate aspects of authenticity, they are often confused as one.
Handler and Saxton (1988:243) notice this distinction when they point out that "An authentic experience ... is one in which individuals feel themselves to be in touch both with a 'real' world and with their 'real'
selves" (1988:24-3). Selwyn (1996a) goes one step further to link the experience of a "real" world to "authenticity as knowledge"—namely, "cool" authenticity—and to relate the experience of a "real" self to
"authenticity as feeling"—namely, "hot" authenticity. However, it would be wrong to propose that the emotional experience of the "real" self ("hot authenticity") necessarily entails, coincides with, or results
from the. epistemological experience of a "real" world out there ("cool authenticity"), as if the latter is•the sole cause of the former (effect). As will be shown, this differentiation of "the authenticity of experi-
ences" from "the authenticity of toured objects" is crucial for intro-
ducineexisteritial authenticity" as an alternative source of authentic
experiences. Certain toured objects, such as nature, are in a strict . sense irrelevant to authenticity in MacCannell's sense. However, nat-
ure tourism is surely one of the major ways.of experiencing a "real" ;self. That is to say, what nature tourism involves is an existential
authenticity rather than the authenticity of objects.
Second, the complex nature of authenticity in tourism is exhibited in the fact that it can be further classified into objective, constructive,
• and existential authenticity (Table 1). Objective authenticity involves a museum-linked usage of the authenticity of the originals that are also the toured objects to be perceived by tourists. It follows that the
authentic experience is caused by the recognition of the toured objects as authentic. As such,- there is an absolute and objective criterion used to measure authenticity. Thus, even though the tourists themselves think they have gained authentic experiences, this can, however, still be judged as inauthentic, if the toured objects are "in fact" false, contrived, or what MacCannell (1973) calls "staged authenticity". By constructive authenticity it is.meant the result of social construction, not an objectively measurable quality of what is being visited. Things appear authentic not because they are inherently authentic but because they_ are constructed as such in terms of points of view, beliefs, perspectives, or powers. This notion is thus relative, negotiable
(Cohen 1988), contextually determined (Salamone -1997), and even ideological (Silver 1993). It can be the projection pf one's dreams, stereotyped images, and expectations onto toured objects (Bruner
1991; Silver 1993). In this sense, what the tourist quests for is symbolic 'authenticity (Culler 1981). Here a big distinction arises; Unlike both objective and constructive (or symbolic) authenticities which involve whether and how the toured.objects arc authentic, existential experi-
ence involves personal or intersubjective. feelings activated by the liminal process of tourist activities.- In such a liminal experience, peOple feel they themselves are much more authentic and' more freely
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