Roles and functions of CSOs during wartime
As argued above, the choice of activities by CSOs and the functions which they perform vis a vis the state and society are partly influenced by the characteristics and timing of the conflict and political system in which they operate. Organisations established during an armed conflict have their own assumptions regarding the conflict roots, which influence their repertoire of action (Meyer 2002). For example, groups and individuals who believe that a conflict has primarily structural sources (e.g. political exclusion, economic inequality, cultural discrimination) are more likely to engage in activities embodying the vertical functions described in section 1, directed towards the state and political society. The first function, counterweight to the power of central authorities, is highly relevant during this stage, since states weakened by armed conflicts cannot properly fulfil their protection duties, and might even be responsible for crimes and human rights abuses of their own. The conflict transformation literature on CSOs (Orjuela 2004, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Barnes 2006) stresses the importance of human rights monitoring (e.g. fact-finding) or protection activities (e.g. through the declaration of “zones of peace” where no arms are allowed) by civil society actors, even though they recognise that these tasks are most often performed by foreign
NGOs and research institutes as opposed to domestic organisations in war-torn societies. The second function, opposition and protest against non-democratic state policies, is also crucial during violent conflicts, where it mainly takes the form of social movements mobilising either against violence and human rights violations, or in favour of negotiation, peace and justice (Garcia-Duran 2005, Barnes 2006). As argued earlier, the dynamics of public protest are partially conditioned by the level of violence used by the state or non-state armed groups against CSOs, since a highly repressive environment is likely to discourage them from voicing their political or social demands through disruptive and confrontational activities. The third function, channelling communication and collaborating in policy- making, is mainly performed, during the phase of armed confrontation, through advocacy on behalf of specific marginalized groups or towards peace and conflict- related issues, or the provision of back-channel communication between opponents (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Gidron et al 2002). The degree of proximity of CSOs to political elites influences their choice of intervention methods. The structural exclusion of certain social or ethnic groups might explain their minimal use of lobbying strategies, which might be more easily and efficiently performed, for instance, by members of the ruling identity group in ethno-political conflicts, army officers in military dictatorships, or business associations in capitalist regimes. Are horizontal functions, directed toward the community, also relevant for wartime peace/human rights CSOs? Here again, it depends on the characteristics and root causes of violence. A perception that war is rooted in the polarisation of society favours horizontal, bridging activities that foster cross-community cultural integration (Meyer 2002). It should be noted here that the causal link between the dynamics of conflict and peace promotion activities is not direct, but mediated by a filter of perceptions, which the social movements literature refers to as the ‘mental frames’ of activists and organisations (Della Porta and Diani 2006). As argued in section 1, the socio-cultural integration function might take many forms, with various degrees of relevance for this early stage of conflict transformation. Although awareness-raising activities (through media work or public education) and bridging activities (through joint work and dialogue exchange) are very popular methods of intervention among conflict transformation CSOs8, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006: 22) found their impact during armed conflicts rather limited, notably because “it proved extremely hard to mobilize people for a long term culture of peace when they were in need of basic needs”.
8 In the sample of peace/conflict resolution organisations selected by Gidron et al for their study of peace mobilisation in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa, almost three quarters (74%) engaged in public education and more than half (59%) organised bridging activities (Meyer 2002: 181).
Therefore, service delivery is cited by several authors as a more primordial function in war-affected areas (Meyer 2002: 181, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 25). The provision of humanitarian, medical, legal, social, educational and other services to populations in need form important parts of CSO activities during violent conflicts, especially in areas where central or local authorities are too weak or unwilling to run adequate public services. 2.2.2 Stage 2: CSOs during peace processes
A peace process is generally meant to designate primarily a process of direct or mediated engagement between the main parties to an armed conflict, in order to find a negotiated solution to the primary issues in dispute (Darby and McGinty 2000: 7-8). Its scope and length have been very variously defined, and they depend largely on the context of their application. In order to fit with the two case studies developed later on, this paper adopts a rather extensive approach which encompasses the stages of conflict mitigation (ceasefire declaration and inter-party negotiations), conflict settlement (signing of a peace agreement), and early peace implementation, up to the first post-war democratic elections (see figure 2 in section 2.1). It should be stressed here once more that, contrary to linear and unidirectional models, the progression of peace processes is very often complex and erratic, and halted, at times, by periods of stalemate or “no-war-no-peace”, or even a return to inter-party fighting or intra-party violence (Darby and McGinty 2000, Dudouet 2006). Finally, in democratisation theory, this stage corresponds with the “democratic transition” phase (Munck 1994), which is marked by a liberalisation of the political system towards more inclusive participation in policy-making (e.g. constitutional reforms, decentralisation, free elections, etc.).