Documentary Rede Globo in Globe reporter made by Hermano Henning on the 2nd Blowout of Anchovy Center Platform (PCE-1) occurred on April 24, 1988.
Located in the Campos basin, the Anchovy Center Platform was the scene of two major incidents. The first blow-out occurred on August 16, 1984 followed by explosion and fire. Most of the workers was taken safely by lifeboat and helicopter, but 42 people died during the evacuation because the life raft platform plummeted. The second incident occurred four years later, on April 24, 1988.
The platform, built in Brazilian shipyards, was installed in 1982 and scaled for all activities necessary drilling and production in water depths of up to 116 meters.
Played key role in the Campos Basin production system. Through ducts received all oil and gas from neighboring fields, which added to the production of Anchovy, passed through a primary processing on the platform and then were pumped to the mainland.
All together there were 21 wells that kept their heads and Christmas trees in the module below the rig substructure. Each well was connected to the BOP through a high-pressure spacer.
Drilled in 1983 the well 7-EM-19D-RJS was directed to the southwest of the reservoir. In 1988, due to decreased oil flow and increase the volume of water, the well was abandoned in the passage formation Macae to be recompletado above in Training Courses-Carapebus. This formation containing gas in porous and crumbly sandstone remained with the original pressure of 8.6 lb / gal. As in 1983 was not provided for the existence of sandstone, the original work of cementing not isolated as it should.
Also a recimentação the void was not made because the external shutter isolated the sandstone. However, no insulation sandstone may have allowed gas contamination of the annular space below the shutter.
In April 1988, during the re-completion, the coating was canhoneado below the sandstone to recimentação and immediately occurred loss of circulation. Thus, the completion fluid weight was reduced and the loss contained. A new cannonade was performed to allow the movement and recimentação the void.
After this operation, gas intrusion into the well occurred without the staff noticing. The major concern now was the loss of six barrels per hour circulation.
On April 24 the attacker gas reached the surface. The driller, figuring there at the well three tubes instead of three sections, pulled the column to the tower limit and Katarina limiter system paralyzed the winch and the packer was unscrewed. To try to control the situation, they tried it two strategies:
a) Install inside BOP and activate the set: However, the column came up with the force of the gas being stopped only by blind drawer;
b) Attacking the well the kill line: The situation got out of control and the platform had to be abandoned.
Even with support vessels, he could not avoid the fire. There was no staff on the platform, but that fire extension was unprecedented for Petrobras. In addition, the main concern was with the neighboring wells. If they were hit, the disaster could be incalculable.
To counter the blow-out, two wells of relief were designed to provide faster and more efficient action in containing the fire. The solution adopted was based on the following factors: knowledge of the well trajectory in blow-out, the good condition of permeability sandstone that facilitated the injection of damping fluid and the difficulties in direct combat on the surface.
It used an anchored probe and a dynamic positioning probe, because there was a large congestion lines on the seabed. The choice of locations took into account: the direction of the winds, the heat radiating area and the need for parallelism between the relief wells and the blow-out for the race wellspot profile, magnetic tool used for trajectory correction well, by detecting the presence of iron in the coating.
Thirty days after its start, the blow-out was extinguished when the second relief well reached the gas tank. Despite the losses on the platform of the loss, the oil is no longer produced and spending control, the other wells have been preserved and there were no deaths. quick decisions based on correct data caused major casualties and damage were avoided, especially after this critical stage gas invasion