In addition, the actors that did have a normative preference for dictatorship did not share the same view of what kind of dictatorship they wanted. President Juan Peron had a normative preference for a populist authoritarian regime. After being overthrown in 1955, Peron gradually left behind his normative preference for authoritarian populism. In the 1960, one faction of the military became attached to the view that it was uniquely qualified to develop Argentina and that a right-wing military dictatorship was the best possible from of government. In 1969, a leftist guerrilla group emerged, committed to revolutionary socialism. And in the 1970s, right-wing terrorist groups emerged; they, too, had a normative preference for dictatorship. But these actors had radically opposing preferences regarding the kind of dictatorship and the kind of policies they sought. They all worked to subvert competitive and authoritarian regimes, but they were incapable of forming a stable authoritarian coalition. O’Donnell (1973) famously called this cycle of unstable authoritarian and competitive regimes “an impossible game.” Reflecting on this era, Huntington (1968:82) claimed that Argentina’s distinguishing characteristic was “the fragility and fleetness of all forms of authority.”
As one attempt after another failed, some actors attempted to impose more radical solutions to Argentina’s dual problems of regime instability and economic disappointment.