Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we investigate whether the claimed higher corporate boards’ effectiveness in
constraining earnings management around the time of the IFRS introduction is permanent
or short-lived and, as such, it is ‘‘just an illusion.’’ Drawing upon the ABV of the firm
(Ocasio, 1997), we suggest that the transition process to IFRS represents a factor which
might have affected INDs’ and ACs members’ allocation of attention to the corporate
financial accounting process, thus temporarily increasing their effectiveness in monitoring
earnings management. Our results are generally consistent with our predictions. The highest
level of monitoring effectiveness of INDs and ACINDs is associated with 2005 (i.e., the
IFRS transition year), while the level of significance and the strength of the association
seem to weaken as we drift away from the introduction year, showing a linear shift in the
relationship between earnings management and our variables of interest.We also find that
the marginal contribution of each board and AC meeting to earnings management constraint
is not constant. For board meetings (BoardMeet), we find an increased effectiveness
while approaching the IFRS transition period, and for ACs’ meetings (ACMeet), our results
show the graphic form of an ‘‘inverted-U’’ path, being at the highest level while approaching
the IFRS adoption time and then returning to a lower level.