European politics (notably at the national level) then applied that analysis to the causes of the
Greek debt crisis, its solutions, and its implications on the future of European institutions.
Historical institutionalism mediates the debate between functionalists and
intergovernmentalists over European integration. Historically, functional integration has
advanced, but it has been the result of intergovernmental bargaining. However,
intergovernmentalism does not sufficiently explain why Member State interests shift over time.
Thus, historical institutionalist scholarship is compelling because it recognizes that political
development “must be understood as a process that unfolds over time” and that institutions –
“formal rules, policy structures, or norms” – help determine the viewpoints of rational actors
within the European system (Pierson, 1996, 126).
The emphasis on institutions also helps explain the role of “soft,” cultural factors in
decision making, since cultural norms are a type of institution. However, it accepts that leaders
ultimately make decisions – as reflected in the intergovernmental bargaining that Europe has
seen between Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, with Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel
Barroso playing secondary roles – and that their interests will be determined by the resources and
constraints of their positions, such as the need to satisfy national electorates.
This does not presuppose the likelihood that Chief of Government preferences can
change over time, or the role that European institutions can play in creating unintended
consequences for Member States – which ultimately explains how European integration has been
achieved in incremental steps that do not present egregious attacks on Member State sovereignty.
Given the advantages of these nuances, my research and analysis of the causes of the
Greek debt crisis, the policies that have been adopted to manage it, and the institutional reforms