5. Variable measurement and methodological approach
5.1. Executive incentives
We have detailed data about the annual salary, annual bonus, annual restricted stock and option grants, and expected payouts
from long-term incentive plans (e.g., stock options, restricted stock, performance units, and performance shares) for each
executive in our sample. We use this information to calculate two complementary measures of incentive compensation. Our first
measure is the total value of annual executive compensation, which is computed as the sum of all of the components of
compensation, where restricted stock is valued using the market value at the date of the grant and stock options are valued using
the Black-Scholes risk-neutral value.11 This approach provides one measure of an agent’s incentives, since total annual flow
Graham et al. (2010) use financial statement data to estimate the BTG from 1993 to 2008 and find that book income has exceeded estimated
taxable income in all years except 2001 and 2008 (i.e., years with excessive losses).
9Seidman (2010) conjectures that the growing book-tax gap could also be due to changes in accounting methods over time.
10There continue to be many unanswered questions about the book-tax gap. It is frequently argued that tax aggressiveness must have increased over
the mid- to late-1990s, as reported corporate profits surged more than did reported taxable income. However, it is unclear why firms would begin to seek
to lower their tax burden more during this period rather than during others. What changed during this time period? While the sophistication of capital
markets has increased over time, yielding new sheltering opportunities, the extent of the increase in the book-tax gap seems to far exceed documented
examples of product sheltering (see Graham and Tucker, 2006; Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, many new sheltering products were created because
Treasury had eliminated an original transaction (e.g., the elimination of ‘‘Boss’’ led to the creation of ‘‘Son of Boss’’).
11The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is calculated using continuously compounded
monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated interest rate
8
5. Variable measurement and methodological approach
5.1. Executive incentives
We have detailed data about the annual salary, annual bonus, annual restricted stock and option grants, and expected payouts
from long-term incentive plans (e.g., stock options, restricted stock, performance units, and performance shares) for each
executive in our sample. We use this information to calculate two complementary measures of incentive compensation. Our first
measure is the total value of annual executive compensation, which is computed as the sum of all of the components of
compensation, where restricted stock is valued using the market value at the date of the grant and stock options are valued using
the Black-Scholes risk-neutral value.11 This approach provides one measure of an agent’s incentives, since total annual flow
Graham et al. (2010) use financial statement data to estimate the BTG from 1993 to 2008 and find that book income has exceeded estimated
taxable income in all years except 2001 and 2008 (i.e., years with excessive losses).
9Seidman (2010) conjectures that the growing book-tax gap could also be due to changes in accounting methods over time.
10There continue to be many unanswered questions about the book-tax gap. It is frequently argued that tax aggressiveness must have increased over
the mid- to late-1990s, as reported corporate profits surged more than did reported taxable income. However, it is unclear why firms would begin to seek
to lower their tax burden more during this period rather than during others. What changed during this time period? While the sophistication of capital
markets has increased over time, yielding new sheltering opportunities, the extent of the increase in the book-tax gap seems to far exceed documented
examples of product sheltering (see Graham and Tucker, 2006; Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, many new sheltering products were created because
Treasury had eliminated an original transaction (e.g., the elimination of ‘‘Boss’’ led to the creation of ‘‘Son of Boss’’).
11The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is calculated using continuously compounded
monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 12 months of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated interest rate
8
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