that, in order to resist Chinese invasion, the Prince of Keng Tung had made a deal with the chief of neighbouring hill dwellers to disrupt Chinese supply lines. They raided the caravans as they came over the high passes, seized the pack animals and took them to their villages, where they slaughtered and ate them. The Chinese were defeated four times in four years as a result of these guerrilla tactics (McCleod undated).
The Shan also resisted Burmese authority, particularly when the army was focusing attention on conflicts elsewhere. When tribute demands were excessive, the princes of the muang threatened to appeal to China. Successive kings of Burma were reluctant to have China drawn into their disputes with the Shan, and often moderated their demands. In a well-known palace story, a legendary king of Mandalay muses on the history of Shan rebellions and expresses anxiety in case he should upset the princes (Fielding-Hall 1997).
Another tactic used by the Shan when they felt under threat was to pay tribute to Burma and China as a way of appeasing them both. Some Shan princes owned two sets of tribute clothes that they wore as appropriate on state occasions. There were Chinese and Burmese representatives at some courts who kept an eye on the Shan and reported back to their governments. The British, in an attempt to assess where the real influence lay, listened to the languages spoken at the courts, generally a local form of Tai and either Burmese or Chinese.
At times the Shan tolerated Burmese occupation because of threats of invasion from neighbouring Siam. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, following the defeat of the Burmese by the Siamese, the rulers of Chiang Mai sent an army into the Shan states where they captured thousands of people who were forcibly marched to Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang and Nan for resettlement (Grabowsky 1993). In the 1840s the diplomat Thao Sitthimongkhon was sent from Chiang Mai to the Shan states. He reported that 1500 Burmese troops were stationed in Muang Nai and he reckoned there were 20,000 Shan males eligible for Burmese military service if the Siamese should attempt another invasion (Wilson and Hanks 1985).
Although the Shan princes enlisted hill dwellers to help protect them from Burmese and Chinese incursions, they could not be relied on as permanent allies in this fluctuating power game. In the nineteenth century, fear of the Kachin was particularly strong. The Prince of Hsenwi, like other princes, paid many kilos of silver to stop them raiding his state. If not appeased, the Kachin were capable of torching settlements and kidnapping Shan villagers who they sold as slaves.
When the British and French colonised inland Southeast Asia, their representatives were confused by the muang and tribute systems. Europeans put little effort into understanding the concept of ‘areas of influence’ where local deals meant the balance of power was constantly shifting and the aim of the Shan was to maintain a degree of independence. The Europeans wanted clearly defined boundaries marked on accurate maps showing watersheds and mountain ranges. Because they thought they could benefit from a western-style survey, the Chinese and Siamese agreed. In 1893 a British delegation led by Sir George Scott met