According to Reply to McLachlan and Swales, they give the reasons to ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON why commercial surrogate motherhood unethically commodifies women and children: because they agree that the nature of children demands that they not be sold, McLachlan and Swales go to great lengths to deny that contract pregnancy amounts to the literal sale of parental and custodial rights over children. They argue that from a legal point of view, the mother is paid not to transfer her parental and custodial rights over the child to the father, but merely to “relinquish her right to claim legal parenthood of the child, and to relinquish her [de facto] custody.” Because her right is not transferred but relinquished, the pregnancy contract does not literally involve a legal sale of parental rights. Commodification is an ethical and cultural concept, not a legal one. Even if the pregnancy contract does not involve a transaction that is legally defined as a sale, it may still