There is an issue about whether the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or ‘practical
wisdom’ can accommodate the idea of ‘theory-informed ethical inquiry’. Carr
(2004, 61–62) has argued, contrary to my view, that Aristotle’s concept of phronesis
does not name a reasoned state of ethical judgement, but rather a process grounded
in taken-for-granted beliefs that are embodied in a practical tradition. He contends
that phronesis is not always sufficient to determine good practice in some situations.
Problems arise that cannot be resolved on the basis of traditional understandings of
good practice. They challenge practitioners to call these existing understandings into
question in order to discern new ways of expressing the values or ends that are
inherent in the tradition. Carr points out that thinking of this kind is the process by
which established ethical knowledge gets reconceived to develop the tradition. It
will entail a rigorous examination of the biases (pre-understandings, even prejudices)
about good practice that practitioners bring to their situation, and a systematic
gathering of evidence around the problem(s) it presents. Carr concludes that
although this form of ethical reasoning depends on phronesis, it reflexively transcends
it. I am inclined to persist with my interpretation of the concept of phronesis,
and in this respect draw support from Joseph Dunne’s meticulous scholarship on
Aristotle’s concepts of practical knowledge (see Dunne 1993, 244). He cites textual
evidence which makes it clear that phronesis picks out a rational capacity for ethical
action.