Burma’s determined policy of neutrality in the Cold War did not prevent its becoming the second of Southeast Asia’s military dictatorships, in 1962. Like Indonesia’s, Burma’s armed force, the Tatmadaw, believed itself an heir to the revolutionary struggle against Japanese and British, essential to the survival of the state. Its units were more accustomed to sustaining themselves by rent- seeking in legal and illegal business than to control by civilian paymasters. By 1956 it had achieved a unified command of the three services under General Ne Win, fellow-Thakin of Aung San and บ Nu. The civilian politicians, by contrast, had been in disarray since Aung San’s assassination in 1947, with the ruling AFPFL appearing an ever more dysfunctional and corrupt coalition, up to its eventual split in 1958. Under pressure from Ne Win, Prime Minister บ Nu then agreed to hand authority to a caretaker government led by Ne Win and the Tatmadaw, simply to deal with the temporary crisis in six months. Ne Win had this period extended until elections in I960, but meanwhile gave an appearance of purposefulness in cleaning up Rangoon, fighting the commu¬nists, controlling prices, and replacing discredited politicians and Shan and Karen traditional chiefs.