First, interpretive theorists deny that general statements are a uniquely powerful form of social knowledge. To the contrary, they consider statements about the unique and contingent features of social life to be as valuable as general statements. Generalizations often deprive our understanding of social life: of what is most distinctly and significantly human about it.
Secondly, interpretive theorists reject the claim that ahistorical generalizations can not explain particular cases. Such generalizations are mere descriptions. Just as we can say various objects are red without explaining anything else about them, so we can say various countries are democracies without explaining any other feature they have in common. Interpretive theorists reject explanations of actions that rely on transhistorical generalities because they think that actions are inherently contingent.
Most philosophers now argue that the social sciences use languages assuming choice and contingency and so are incompatible with the forms of explanation found in the natural sciences (Davidson, 1980). In this view, the intentionality of actions means that to explain them we must invoke the reasons of the actors in a way that implies the actors could have reasoned and acted differently. Actions are the products of decisions, not the determined outcomes of general laws. Thus, social science needs narrative explanations that work by unpacking the contingent and particular conditions of actions and events, rather than by searching for transhistorical models, classifications, or correlations.
First, interpretive theorists deny that general statements are a uniquely powerful form of social knowledge. To the contrary, they consider statements about the unique and contingent features of social life to be as valuable as general statements. Generalizations often deprive our understanding of social life: of what is most distinctly and significantly human about it.
Secondly, interpretive theorists reject the claim that ahistorical generalizations can not explain particular cases. Such generalizations are mere descriptions. Just as we can say various objects are red without explaining anything else about them, so we can say various countries are democracies without explaining any other feature they have in common. Interpretive theorists reject explanations of actions that rely on transhistorical generalities because they think that actions are inherently contingent.
Most philosophers now argue that the social sciences use languages assuming choice and contingency and so are incompatible with the forms of explanation found in the natural sciences (Davidson, 1980). In this view, the intentionality of actions means that to explain them we must invoke the reasons of the actors in a way that implies the actors could have reasoned and acted differently. Actions are the products of decisions, not the determined outcomes of general laws. Thus, social science needs narrative explanations that work by unpacking the contingent and particular conditions of actions and events, rather than by searching for transhistorical models, classifications, or correlations.
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