Conclusion
This article has sought to identify a pragmatist response to the problem of moral disagreement,
a problem that takes on an acute urgency in a culturally pluralistic society
divided by rival and incompatible value systems. Relying on Richard J. Bernstein’s
retrospective synthesis of the pragmatist tradition, I have suggested that a pragmatist
response to the problem of moral disagreement would move beyond the twin tendencies
of objectivism and relativism, and provide a non-foundational model of moral
discourse and rational choice. I have further argued that such a response would seek
to balance the imperative of fairness with that of reaching an outcome. As examples
of such a pragmatist response, I have compared Habermas’ transcendental model of
moral discourse withMacIntyre’s historicist model. Based on this comparison, I have
argued that Habermas prioritizes outcomes at the cost of fairness, and thatMacIntyre
does the opposite. The tension that emerged from this comparison led to the speculation
this tension might be insurmountable.
This argument has two sets of implications for recent discussions about pragmatism
and communication theory.The first concerns Craig’s (1999, 2007) metamodel.
Russill andCraig have bothmade a compelling case for recognizing pragmatismas an
independent tradition of communication theory with its own internal integrity.The
above analysis compares two models of moral discourse, reading each model as pragmatist
in orientation.They thus both appear to fit squarelywithin the pragmatist tradition
of communication theory as Russill and Craig have formulated it. However, they
also appear to fit within the rhetorical tradition as Craig has formulated it. According
to Craig, the rhetorical tradition theorizes communication as “[t]he practical art
of discourse,” and theorizes the problems of communication as “[s]ocial exigency
requiring collective deliberation and judgment” (1999, 133). Bearing in mind that
the metamodel is merely a heuristic device designed to manage the vast and dizzying
field of communication theory, that the twomodels can nonetheless easily be situated
in more than one tradition suggests a certain limitation of the metamodel in categorizing
certain theories. [Correction made after online publication April 2, 2015: this
paragraph has been revised to more accurately reflect Russill’s views.]
The second set of implications concerns the relationship of pragmatism to
rhetoric. As I have stated in the introduction, pragmatism is mor