8.Conclusion
The rejection of absolutism should be seen as a banishment of mathematics from the Garden of Eden, the realm of cetaity and truth. The ‘loss of certainty’ (Kline,1980)doere not represent a loss of knowledge.
There is an illuminating analogy with developments in modern physics, General Relativity Theory requires relinquishing absolute, universal frames of reference in favour of s relativistic perspective. In Quatum Theory, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle means that notions of precisely determined measurements of position and momentum for particles also hashas had to be given up. But what we see here are not the loss ofknowledge, of absolute frames and certainty. Rather we see the growth of knowledge, bringing with it a realizationof the limits of what can be known. Relativity and Uncertainty in physics represent major sdvances in knowledge, adnances which take us to the limits of knowledge(for so long as the theories are retained).
Likewise in mathematics, as our knowledge has become better founded and we learn more about its basis, we have come to realize that absolutist view is an idealization, a myth. This represents an advance in knowledge, not a retreat from past certainty. The absolutist Garden of Eden was nothing a fool’s paradise.
Notes
In this chapter, for sirnplicity.the definition of truth in mathematics is assued to be unprbleatic and unambiguous. Whilst justifird as a simplifying assumption, sincc none of the arguments of the chapter hinge on the ambiguity of this notion, the meaning of the conept of truth in mathematics has changed over time. We can distinguish between three truh-related concepts used in mathcmatics:
(a)Thcre is the traditional view of mathematical truth, namely the]at a mathematical truth is a general statement which not only correctly describes all its instances I the world (as does a true empirical gen),but only necessarily true of its instances liplicit in this view is the assumption that mathematical theories have anintended interpretation, namely some idealization of the world.
(b)There is the rnodern view of the truth of a mathematical statement relative to a background mathematical to this theory; the statement is satisfied by some interprctation or model of the theory. According to this (and the following) view, mathenmatics is open to multiple interprctations, i.e., possible worlds. Truth consists merely in being true (i.e., satisfied, following Tarski,1936)in one of these possible worlds.
(c) There is the modern view of the logicah truth or nalidity of a maathcmatical statement relaivc to abackground theory; the statement is satisfied by all interpretions or modcls of the theory . Thus the statcment is truc in all of these possible worlds.
Truth in sense( c) can be established by deduction from the background theory as an axiom set. For a given theory, truths in a sense( c)are a subset(usually a propert) of truths in sense (b).further in the next chapter, as one of several contributors to a proposed social constructivist philosophy of mathematics.
E. Empiricism
The empiricist view of the nature of mathematics (‘naïve empiricism’ ,to distinguish it from Lakatos’ quasi-empiricism) holds that the truths of mathematics are empirical generalizations. We can distinguish two empiricist theses: (i) the concepts of mathematics have empirical origins, and (ii) the truths of mathematics have empirical justification, that is, are derived from observations of the physical world. The first thesis unobjectionable , and is accepted by most philosophers of mathematics (given that many concepts are not directly formed from observations but are defined in terms of other concepts which lead, via definitional chains, to observational concepts) .The second thesis is rejected by all but empiricists, since it leads to some absurdities .THE initial objection is that most mathematical knowledge is accepted on theoretical, as opposed to empirical grounds. Thus I know that 999,999+1 =1000,000 not through having observed its truth in the world, but through my theoretical knowledge of number and numeration.
Mill (1961) partly anticipates this objections,suggesting that the principles and axioms of mathematics are induced from observations of the world, and that other truths are derived from these by deduction. However,empiricism is open to a number of further criticisms.
First of all, when our experience contradicts elementary mathematical truths, we do not give them up (Davis and Hersh, 1980). Rather we assume that some error has crept in to our reasoning, because there is shared agreement about mathematics, which precludes the rejection of mathematical truths(Wittgenstein, 1978). Thus, ‘1+1 =3’ is necessarily false, not because one rebbit added to another does not give three rabbits, but because by definition ‘1+1’ means ‘the successor of 1’ and ‘2’ is the successor of ‘1’
Secondly’ mathematics is largely abstract’ and so many of its concepts do not have their origins in observations of theworkd. Rather they are based on previously formed concepts. Truths about such concepts’ which form the buik of mathematics, cannot therefore be said to be induced from observations of the external world.
Finally, empiricism can be criticized for focusing almost exclusively on foundationist issues, and failing to account adequately for the nature of mathematics. This, as has been argued above, is the major purpose of the philosophy of mathematics. On the basis of this criticism we can reject the naïve empiricist view of mathematics as inadequate.
8.Conclusion
The rejection of absolutism should be seen as a banishment of mathematics from the Garden of Eden, the realm of cetaity and truth. The ‘loss of certainty’ (Kline,1980)doere not represent a loss of knowledge.
There is an illuminating analogy with developments in modern physics, General Relativity Theory requires relinquishing absolute, universal frames of reference in favour of s relativistic perspective. In Quatum Theory, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle means that notions of precisely determined measurements of position and momentum for particles also hashas had to be given up. But what we see here are not the loss ofknowledge, of absolute frames and certainty. Rather we see the growth of knowledge, bringing with it a realizationof the limits of what can be known. Relativity and Uncertainty in physics represent major sdvances in knowledge, adnances which take us to the limits of knowledge(for so long as the theories are retained).
Likewise in mathematics, as our knowledge has become better founded and we learn more about its basis, we have come to realize that absolutist view is an idealization, a myth. This represents an advance in knowledge, not a retreat from past certainty. The absolutist Garden of Eden was nothing a fool’s paradise.
Notes
In this chapter, for sirnplicity.the definition of truth in mathematics is assued to be unprbleatic and unambiguous. Whilst justifird as a simplifying assumption, sincc none of the arguments of the chapter hinge on the ambiguity of this notion, the meaning of the conept of truth in mathematics has changed over time. We can distinguish between three truh-related concepts used in mathcmatics:
(a)Thcre is the traditional view of mathematical truth, namely the]at a mathematical truth is a general statement which not only correctly describes all its instances I the world (as does a true empirical gen),but only necessarily true of its instances liplicit in this view is the assumption that mathematical theories have anintended interpretation, namely some idealization of the world.
(b)There is the rnodern view of the truth of a mathematical statement relative to a background mathematical to this theory; the statement is satisfied by some interprctation or model of the theory. According to this (and the following) view, mathenmatics is open to multiple interprctations, i.e., possible worlds. Truth consists merely in being true (i.e., satisfied, following Tarski,1936)in one of these possible worlds.
(c) There is the modern view of the logicah truth or nalidity of a maathcmatical statement relaivc to abackground theory; the statement is satisfied by all interpretions or modcls of the theory . Thus the statcment is truc in all of these possible worlds.
Truth in sense( c) can be established by deduction from the background theory as an axiom set. For a given theory, truths in a sense( c)are a subset(usually a propert) of truths in sense (b).further in the next chapter, as one of several contributors to a proposed social constructivist philosophy of mathematics.
E. Empiricism
The empiricist view of the nature of mathematics (‘naïve empiricism’ ,to distinguish it from Lakatos’ quasi-empiricism) holds that the truths of mathematics are empirical generalizations. We can distinguish two empiricist theses: (i) the concepts of mathematics have empirical origins, and (ii) the truths of mathematics have empirical justification, that is, are derived from observations of the physical world. The first thesis unobjectionable , and is accepted by most philosophers of mathematics (given that many concepts are not directly formed from observations but are defined in terms of other concepts which lead, via definitional chains, to observational concepts) .The second thesis is rejected by all but empiricists, since it leads to some absurdities .THE initial objection is that most mathematical knowledge is accepted on theoretical, as opposed to empirical grounds. Thus I know that 999,999+1 =1000,000 not through having observed its truth in the world, but through my theoretical knowledge of number and numeration.
Mill (1961) partly anticipates this objections,suggesting that the principles and axioms of mathematics are induced from observations of the world, and that other truths are derived from these by deduction. However,empiricism is open to a number of further criticisms.
First of all, when our experience contradicts elementary mathematical truths, we do not give them up (Davis and Hersh, 1980). Rather we assume that some error has crept in to our reasoning, because there is shared agreement about mathematics, which precludes the rejection of mathematical truths(Wittgenstein, 1978). Thus, ‘1+1 =3’ is necessarily false, not because one rebbit added to another does not give three rabbits, but because by definition ‘1+1’ means ‘the successor of 1’ and ‘2’ is the successor of ‘1’
Secondly’ mathematics is largely abstract’ and so many of its concepts do not have their origins in observations of theworkd. Rather they are based on previously formed concepts. Truths about such concepts’ which form the buik of mathematics, cannot therefore be said to be induced from observations of the external world.
Finally, empiricism can be criticized for focusing almost exclusively on foundationist issues, and failing to account adequately for the nature of mathematics. This, as has been argued above, is the major purpose of the philosophy of mathematics. On the basis of this criticism we can reject the naïve empiricist view of mathematics as inadequate.
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