happiness is good and what promotes human
misery is evil. The 18th-century philosopher,
David Hume, based this judgement on the
observation that ‘. . . it is impossible for such a
creature as man to be totally indifferent to the
well or ill-being of his fellow creatures’ (Hume
1777:45).3
Jeremy Bentham is the historical figure most
closely associated with the view that the objective
of society should be to maximize aggregate
happiness. Although Bentham did not
claim authorship of the phrase, ‘the greatest
happiness of the greatest number’, he certainly
endorsed that objective. He also argued that an
action ‘may be said to be conformable to the
principle of utility . . . when the tendency it has
to augment the happiness of the community is
greater than any it has to diminish it’ (Bentham
1789:I.7).
Richard Layard, a modern-day Benthamite
—also an eminent economist and member of
the British House of Lords—argues in favour
of maximizing aggregate happiness as follows:
People are calling out for a concept of the
common good—and that is exactly what
the Enlightenment ideal provides. It defines the
common good as the greatest happiness of all,
requiring us to care for others as well as for ourselves.
And it advocates the kind of fellow-feeling
for others that in itself increases our happiness
and reduces our isolation. (Layard 2005:5–6)
Should the objective of enabling the pursuit of
GNH be pursued by seeking to maximise
aggregate happiness? Leaving aside the question
of whether it is possible with known technology
to add the happiness of different
individuals together to measure the sum of
their happiness, what objections could anyone
have to maximisation of aggregate happiness?
One reason why some people object to
maximisation of aggregate happiness has to do
with what Derek Parfit describes as the ‘repugnant
conclusion’. It is likely that the sum total