The crisis proved to be something of a turning point for the Clinton administration’s policy towards China. The management of the crisis was judged a success: ‘A minimal show of force in the region… work [ed] to reduce tensions, show American resolve, facilitate democracy on Taiwan, and leave room for making further improvements in U.S. – China relations’. The crisis also alerted the administration to the need to play more attention to China. But Congress and the wider public were more struck by what was seen as Beijing’s bullying amid its egregious violation of its commitments on proliferation and intellectual property rights (IPR), as well as its deliberate suppression of human rights. A similar out-come resulted from the administration’s seemingly irresolute handling of a case in which China allowed the shipment to Pakistan of ‘ring magnets’ used for the extraction of enriched uranium from uranium gas. A compromise was reached by which the US did not impose sanctions and the Chinese stated that they would not cooperate with unsafeguarded nuclear programmes. In Congress and the media it was claimed that the administration had once again caved in to business interests. But the administration saw it as a successful example of engagement in practice, whereby intensive negotiations led to a better understanding of each other’s positions that then allowed for a settlement that saved face for both sides. Another example was provided by a deal over IPR that was achieved in June 1996 after protracted negations and posturing by both sides.