Anacker emphasizes that Vasubandhu sets up several provisional constructs, in
the opening lines of his works, only to dissolve them at the end (2002, 2–3). ―Perceptiononly‖
is not to be taken as an ultimate affirmation of consciousness, but as a device for
experiencing emptiness, by reminding ourselves that whatever we perceive is, and can
only ever be, our perception. Lest we become attached to ―perception-only‖ Vasubandhu
warns us that this idea too, is just that, an idea. Similarly, claiming that our experience is
like an illusion is not to be taken as implying the nonexistence of external reality.
Ultimately, neither Vasubandhu nor Asaṅga wanted to assert existence or nonexistence,
and therefore, the questions of whether they affirm or negate the external world or the
mind seem to be completely misplaced. Perhaps to these questions, the brothers might
have responded in the same way as the Buddha, that is, by refusing to respond. Our
insistence on wanting an answer points to our tendency to view things dualistically, to
conceive of reality always in terms of existence and nonexistence. Yet, if ultimately
reality is a non-conceptual, nondual, ineffable state, then clearly all questions about what
exists and what does not exist are irrelevant.
To conclude, it might be said that, contrary to many interpretations, this reading
of Mahāyāna philosophy has not found any irreconcilable differences between the
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. A standard Tibetan position, in this respect, regards
Nāgārjuna as exemplifying the highest philosophical understanding, while the Yogācāra
is held supreme in terms of instruction for meditation. This makes perfect sense, of
course, considering that the Yogācāra‘s stated purpose is to set out the path, while
Nāgārjuna‘s was to refute wrong views.