4. Final Comments.
The idea that companies are efficient in using currency derivatives finds ample evidence in the literature. The main goal of this paper was to provide hard evidence on mismanagement of risk strategies that were only reveal by turmoil in financial markets due to financial crisis. We go beyond just showing how Aracruz speculated with derivatives in 2008, contrasting with a good track performance in achieving the optimal hedge since 1999. We use the model developed by Bodnar and Marston (2001) to show that the company’s real hedge position deviated from its optimal ratio and agency theory to explain why it happened.
This case is important because it is hard to find explicit evidence of agency problems resulting in speculation with derivatives, and in the present case this is coupled with significant financial losses from unexpected exchange rates movements following the financial crisis of 2008.
Future lines of research should explore this and other cases of mismanagement of hedging with derivatives to provide more information on how firms really operate their hedging positions. An important question concerns the sources of derivatives losses for companies around the world. Was over hedging also a problem for other companies? Also, cross-section analyses of companies which posted losses in derivaties could identify which governance mechanisms were ineffenctive in preventing excessive risk exposures.